

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



GOVERNMENT LIBRARY

JAN 22 1957

Bulletin

Vol. XXXVI, No. 915

January 7, 1957

SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 18	3
MUTUAL SECURITY AND SOVIET FOREIGN AID • by Philander P. Claxton, Jr.	12
ADMISSION OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS • Messages From President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. . .	39
COLOMBO PLAN NATIONS REVIEW ECONOMIC PROGRESS • Final Communique and Extract From Annual Report	30
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE ON NON- MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO	18

For index see inside back cover

THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVI, No. 915 • PUBLICATION 6433

January 7, 1957

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1955).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

¹U.N.

January

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18

Press release 624 dated December 18

Following is the Department of State's release of Secretary Dulles' news conference of December 18.

Secretary Dulles: I am very glad to be back here again after a little absence. I want to take this occasion to again pay public tribute to the capable and dedicated work that was done by Acting Secretary Hoover during my absence. Also, because we may not meet again before Christmas, I want to wish you all a merry Christmas.

Now, if you have questions.

U.S. Forces in Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of speculation about the possibility of some kind of positive response by the United States to a reference in Premier Bulganin's disarmament message on November 17 about reducing forces in Europe.¹ I think that he suggested: one, cutting back and, two, eventually removing all forces. Can you say what kind of response might be made to this idea or what the possibility for action in this field is?

A. Well, I cannot forecast at this time to you the precise terms of the reply that will be made by President Eisenhower to Premier Bulganin. Actually, I believe that the suggested reply is being considered by the Standing Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in pursuance to our policy of exchanging views about these things with the allies most directly concerned. I think I can say this, that there is no plan, and I think there will be no suggestion in the reply, that our strength in Europe will be reduced. We discussed that matter rather fully at the NATO meeting and in our discussion of the new directive to be given to our military authorities. And the

assumption is that the United States strength in Europe will continue. That doesn't mean that there may not be some adjustment or streamlining of the divisions because that is a program that is being considered by the Defense Department in relation to all our divisions everywhere as part of the effort to make them more mobile and better adapted to modern warfare and new weapons. But there is no planning now in contemplation for reducing United States strength in Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I put the question this way: You have long said that many things are afoot in the Soviet Union, and the evidence is clear that this is true in the satellites. There seems also to be a general feeling here that the satellite situation has changed—the military equation—because the Russians no longer can count on the satellite troops in a conflict with the West. Is this an opportunity to make some new approach on a European political settlement, and, if that were true, would that involve some alteration of the military posture of the two sides?

A. I would think that, if developments within the satellite nations took such a turn that they became genuinely independent nations, that would justify a general review of the situation. The United States has made clear—I expressed it in the speech which I gave at Dallas at the end of October, I think it was²—and President Eisenhower said the same thing shortly thereafter, that the United States has no purpose at all to turn these satellite countries into our allies, in the sense that we have no desire to surround the Soviet Union with a band of hostile states and to revive what used to be called the *cordon sanitaire*, which was developed largely by the French after the First World War with a view to circling the Soviet Union with hostile forces. We have made clear our policy in that respect in the hope of facilitat-

¹ U.N. doc. A/3366.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1956, p. 695.

ing in that way an evolution—a peaceful evolution—of the satellite states toward genuine independence. So far there has not been any response to that sufficient to justify, I believe, any basic reappraisal of the military position. It is of course quite true that the situation has changed—the equation has changed—that, whereas perhaps a couple years ago the Soviet Union felt, and we perhaps felt, that the Soviet could count on 60 or more divisions from the satellite forces to fight on its side, it now looks as though the Soviets could not count on them fighting on their side. They might be shooting in the other direction, and it might require a subtraction in the Soviet forces to balance that factor in the equation. Nevertheless, even taking that into account, the potential Soviet strength in Europe is so large that even after, as I say, taking that into account, the problem of military balance does not yet permit, in my opinion, and in the opinion of our military advisers, of any reduction in the strength of NATO forces in Europe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you then saying that the continued partition of Germany and the complete independence of all satellite states are prerequisites of any American acceptance of an all-Europe security treaty?

A. Well, I am saying this: I think that if there were a genuine independence of the satellite countries that would certainly facilitate the kind of a review that had been suggested. I also would say that we are not prepared to review the military situation on the continent of Europe on any basis which presupposes a line drawn through Germany and which implies the continued partition of Germany.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel, after your visit to Paris, that there has been something of a re-establishment of the good feeling that existed previously to the Suez crisis with our allies?

A. I think there is no doubt at all but what relations are better than before I went to Paris and had the talks that took place within the NATO Council and also the talks that took place outside of the NATO Council. I would not go so far as to say that there are still no scars that remain—no differences of opinion about past performance. But the best way to forget the past is to be planning for the future. That is a rule that I think applies to life in all its aspects, including inter-

national life. As we think about the future and plan for the future together, there tends to be a healing of the old wounds, and I think that process is under way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some suggestion that possibly one of the great boons which might come from the visit of Mr. Nehru to this country would be an eventual settlement of the problem in the Middle East. Can you give us any comment about that, or any indication of what the talks are apt to lead to, sir?

A. No, I'm sorry to say that I do not feel that I can comment upon Prime Minister Nehru's visit here while the visit is still in process. I have not yet had a chance to talk with the President because he is on his way back now from Gettysburg, and I don't know what has transpired there. I had my own talk with Prime Minister Nehru on Sunday afternoon. But while the talks are going on I prefer not to comment upon them.

Question of Consultation With Allies

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what degree is the United States committed by your commitments in the Paris meeting to consult with its allies, and to what degree is it not committed to consult with its allies on international problems?

A. Well, I made clear there that, as far as consultation went, we were prepared to consult fully with our allies about any of our problems or any of our policies in any part of the world. I said that our policies were known, there was nothing secret about them, and we would be glad to discuss them, explain them, and if any of our allies had any suggestions to make we would be glad to take them into account. And I said that applied to our policies whether in relation to the Far East, or the Near East, or this American Hemisphere.

Now, then, I made another point, however, which was that in these areas we are bound by treaty to take action in certain contingencies. All of that is known in advance. It is known, for example, and I pointed out in Paris, that we are bound by treaty with the Republic of China on Taiwan to join with it to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores in the event of attack. If that attack occurs, we will have to comply with our treaty obligations. The time to discuss that policy, if they want to discuss it, is now, and we are prepared to discuss it now, and, indeed, I did expound

it a year ago, I think, to the NATO Council. Therefore, we are prepared to discuss and counsel with them about policies anywhere. But where action is required we cannot agree to suspend action to which we are bound by treaty with other allies. We cannot suspend action to comply with that treaty in order at that stage to discuss it with the NATO allies.

I would like to add one thought here because there is a good deal of misunderstanding, I found, in Paris on this question of consultation. It is assumed that our complaint about the British and the French is primarily because they failed to consult with us, or with the NATO Council. That is not the case. It is quite true that the actual attack occurred without our knowledge and came as a complete surprise to us. But there had been prior consultation about this matter for nearly 3 months. The views of the United States were fully known as to why we were opposed to this. We had discussed it during the three trips that I made to London, beginning with my first trip there the end of July. It had been discussed with the British and French Ministers when we met here at the Security Council meeting. The matter had been fully discussed; they knew our views; they knew why we were opposed to any such action. And our complaint is not that there was not a discussion of these matters; not that we had not had an opportunity to make our views known—the point was that we considered that such an attack under the circumstances would violate the charter of the United Nations and would violate article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty itself, which requires all the parties to that treaty to renounce the use of force and to settle their disputes by peaceful means. That is our complaint: that the treaty was violated; not that there was not consultation. And we made perfectly clear that as far as we are concerned we want to live up to our treaty obligations, as we understand them. We are prepared to explain those obligations, to give our interpretations of them, so there is no lack of understanding about what our policies are. But if we are bound by treaty to do something, or if we are bound by treaty not to do something, we expect to conform to those treaties. Those treaty obligations are not themselves a matter of discussion in the sense that we will have to submit to the NATO Council whether or not we comply with our treaties.

Clearing Suez Canal

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems to be generally agreed that Europe's economic difficulties will increase in direct proportion to the length of time the Suez Canal remains closed. There are some difficulties regarding the clearing of the canal right now in which Egypt and the United Nations and Britain and France are particularly involved. Do we have a deadline which we have set by which the canal must be cleared, and, whether we have or whether we have not, what are we doing to persuade Mr. Nasser to cooperate in this venture?

A. Well, there is no deadline that I know of fixing a date by which the canal must be cleared. It would be quite impossible to have such a deadline because the engineers who are studying the matter don't have the slightest idea yet of the full nature of the obstacles or how long it will take to clear the obstacles. Therefore, to have a deadline for completion would be physically and technically impossible. Now we are, of course, deeply concerned that the canal shall get back into operation just as soon as possible. That is a matter of economic and financial concern to the nations of Europe, to the nations of Asia, and to the United States itself, which is carrying some of the financial burdens of this interruption. Therefore, our national interest and our international interest is that the canal shall get back into operation as soon as possible. There are a great many practical and psychological problems that are involved, and our belief is that the best way to get that result is to give backing to the Secretary-General, who has been entrusted with the primary responsibility in this matter. He has competent people as his advisers. We are always at his disposal to give any advice that he thinks he can usefully get from the United States. But we are backing Mr. Hammarskjöld in this matter as the best way to get the job done.

Policy on "Cold War"

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports from Moscow, from Western correspondents and diplomats there, that the Soviet Government appears to have reached an operational assumption that this Government in Washington desires and intends a resumption of the cold war. Would you please clarify for us the actual policy of this Government in respect to that matter?

A. Well, I can say very categorically that the United States does not desire "a resumption of the cold war." Of course, this phrase "cold war" is a somewhat ambiguous phrase, and I don't expect you would find the definition of it if you turn to Webster's Dictionary or the Oxford Dictionary. So there is always a question of definition when there are used somewhat loose phrases of this sort. But the change in the atmosphere that has occurred since the Geneva conference is not due to any action of the United States that I am aware of; certainly, not due to any desire upon our part. It has been due to Soviet action. It has tried to stir up trouble in the Near East, to try to obstruct a settlement of the Near East problems at these Suez conferences. It was always the apparent policy of the Soviet Foreign Minister to try to see to it that no agreement was reached between Egypt and the British and the French. And whenever it looked like an agreement might be near at hand it was the Soviet Government carrying on propaganda in the Arab countries which fought against and denounced the proposed settlement, making it very difficult indeed for the Arab countries to accept the settlement. Then, of course, we know the tragic events of Hungary. I may say, also, of course, there was the fact that at the Geneva summit conference there was a very definite agreement that Germany should be reunified by free elections. That agreement was torn up. All of those have created an impression as to the Soviet policy which seems to be not readily reconcilable with what they indicated at Geneva. Between the actions that have been taken with respect to the Geneva agreement about Germany, the policies in the Near East, and the policies in Hungary, it doesn't look very much as though the Soviet Union wanted really to develop friendly relations with the free world. But the responsibility for that, I think, lies wholly upon the Soviet Union, and there is no desire or plotting on our part to bring that about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has Britain told the United States that it intends to cut its NATO troop commitment by about perhaps 50 percent?

A. Well, there has been a discussion in Paris at the NATO meeting, and in some of the talks that took place in more restricted groups as a by-product of the Council meeting, that the situation would call for a reconsideration of the United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe. You

may recall that at the time when the pledge of those forces was made, at the time of the London and Paris Accords and the making of the Brussels Treaty, or revision of the Brussels Treaty, the British pledge contained a reference to the possibility of financial considerations justifying a reconsideration of that pledge.³ I think there is a feeling that the financial position of the United Kingdom at the present time does justify some reconsideration of that pledge, and the reconsideration is being given. There has been no decision as yet as to what will take place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we know that France and Britain need crude oil and fuel oil, and we know that they have a shortage of gasoline. Now we stand ready to give them everything they need, and we have even a surplus of tanker bottoms at present to carry this to them. Why is it they have informed this Government they do not want to take any gasoline when they have a shortage?

A. Well, I am afraid you are out of my depth. I didn't know that they had given such information.

Q. Well, if you don't know it, then maybe they haven't.

A. I don't claim to be omniscient. There are lots of things happen that I don't know about.

Q. We have been told in other press conferences by officers of this administration that Britain and France didn't want gasoline.

A. It may be that their primary desire may be in the form of crude oil [and do their own refining].⁴

Japan's Admission to U.N.

Q. Mr. Secretary, today and perhaps by this time Japan is scheduled to become the 80th member of the United Nations. Would you have any comment about her accession to membership in the United Nations?

A. I just got word that Japan has been admitted to the United Nations by a vote of 77 in favor and no oppositions. That is an event which the United States very greatly welcomes. We have been seeking that for several years. The road has been rocky because of the Soviet veto that was imposed for so long.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 520.

⁴ Bracketed phrase added to transcript.

You will perhaps recall my very special interest in the Japanese situation because of the part I had in negotiating the Treaty of Peace with Japan. We expressed at that time the hope that Japan would quickly be admitted to the United Nations. Japan is surely entitled to take its place in that grouping of the family of nations. We are confident that Japan, by its presence there, will strengthen the United Nations, that its part will be constructive. So it is not only a result to which the Japanese are entitled and which we are very glad to see happen; it is also a result that the United Nations is entitled to, and that is a point too for which we are gratified.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your attitude toward the latest Soviet proposal for admitting Communist China into the United Nations?

A. Well, I would hope that that is an academic question. The United States stands firmly opposed to the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. I don't think I need perhaps to give all the reasons here, but I think they are ample. They have been expressed earlier at the United Nations General Assembly, and there has been no change in our views since then.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us any indication of what sort of a foreign-aid program is being studied now with a view to requests which will be made to the coming session of Congress—for instance, will there be any possibility of economic aid for Poland? Will there be any request for some sort of a little Marshall plan for Western Europe?

A. I would not be able to comment upon the prospective budget which is in preparation. All of the Departments in the Government are under strict injunction not to comment about the budget until it is approved by the President and can be communicated to the Members of Congress. I would say that, quite apart from the details of the budget, and as to the policy involved, it is, I think, well known that the United States has made contact with the new Polish Government with a view to ascertaining whether there is any mutually acceptable program whereby we could give assistance to Poland which would assist it to maintain its growing independence. But it is unlikely that the amount of that would be a major factor in the budget that we are considering. There is no plan that I am aware of being prepared which would

represent what might be called "a little Marshall plan."

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you try to clarify a point on troops in Europe? You have said this morning that we oppose and are not considering a reduction in military strength and that we will not accept a line dividing Germany but that this does not preclude a possible adjustment or streamlining of forces. Does this, however, mean that we will not consider a bilateral pullback of forces from Germany with the objective of the unification of Germany?

A. I do not see any present likelihood of that becoming a practical proposition.

Possibility of Visit by Marshal Tito

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you favor an early visit to the United States by Marshal Tito?

A. Well, I think that it would serve a useful purpose if there were a visit from Marshal Tito. There are things which might usefully be talked over, I think, in that way. As you know, I went myself to Brioni and talked with Marshal Tito a year ago last November,⁵ and I found that that was a worthwhile conversation. Many things that we talked about then have proved of utility and have indicated an understanding by Marshal Tito of some of the satellite problems which has been confirmed by subsequent events. I think that was a useful talk, and I would think that there might be utility again in such a talk at a high level.

Q. Has a decision been made to invite him, sir?

A. Well, sympathetic consideration is being given to it, although there has not yet been a formal invitation with the fixing of a date, nor indeed do we know definitely that the idea will ever come to consummation. The visit is in the process of detailed development, you might say, at this stage.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there appears to be in Western Europe still some residue of the feeling that, while we pressed the British and French and the Israelis very hard to comply with the United Nations, we have not exerted an equal pressure on the Egyptians to cooperate in both a long-range settlement of the canal problem and in clearing the canal. Now, what could you say on this point spe-

⁵ BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 833.

cifically, and including what our views are on whether the canal clearing operations should begin even before all foreign forces are withdrawn from Egypt?

A. Well, on the last point, I would say that in a sense the canal clearing operations are already under way. Of course, they have been for some time under way in the portion of the canal which is under the control or was under the control of the British and the French. They have also begun in the other part of the canal, because there is going on there the engineering exploratory work which must precede any actual physical work of clearing the canal. You have got to know where the obstacles are, what the nature of the obstacles is, you have got to plan as to what you try to do with them, whether you take them away or shift them, what you do.

There is an area of planning there which must precede the physical attacking of the problem. That is under way at the present time, under the direction of General Wheeler. And I believe that that work then will go on without any interruption as the British and French withdrawal is completed.

Now, the question of whether or not British units will be used there is a highly complicated problem, but I believe there will be no serious interruption of the work because, as I say, this engineering survey and planning has to take place first.

Status of Satellites

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken today of the military equation, of the contemplated reply of this Government to the Bulganin letter, and also of consultation in Paris with our NATO allies. Are we or do we have in the making any startling new proposals to take the initiative at this time, as some people say, of opportunity for the free world?

A. Well, I would not want to characterize our plans as being startling or new, as far as that is concerned. The developments are taking place. We have great hope that they will result in a very important change in the international picture. I doubt whether that change that we hope for can be advanced by anything that is very startling. I have already indicated that the United States is very openminded to any suggestions that might be made as to the status—whether neutralization or

otherwise—of satellite countries which would take away any fear, I would hope, by the Soviet Union that it would be physically or militarily endangered if it facilitated this evolution to independence.

Now, that is a basic policy position which has been enunciated by the President and me in the past. It has not been developed further because there has been no particular response to it. But I would hope that perhaps, through that line of thinking, we might at some stage help to produce a situation which would be better from everybody's standpoint, also including the Soviet Union.

I had a talk about 6 months ago, I think, with one of the leading figures in Europe, who knew a great deal about the satellite situation. And he was saying to me, "It's very important that this satellite situation should develop in such a way that the Soviet Union is surrounded by friendly countries." And I said, "We have no desire whatever that the Soviet Union shall be surrounded by unfriendly countries. But," I said, "that is not a matter which is in our control as much as it is in the control of the Soviet Union." I said, "Unless they move fast, they are going to find that they are going to be surrounded by unfriendly peoples and consequently in the long run by unfriendly governments. They have got to move fast or else events will get out of their control."

I said that 6 months ago. And that is the way things have gone. But they haven't gone that way because the United States wanted them to go that way. We would have liked to have seen the evolution in a more complete and orderly way, and we are entirely prepared to make it as clear as can be that the United States has no desire to capitalize upon this situation as part of any program of a hostile character against the Soviet Union.

Q. Is it correct, sir, to assume from what you are saying about the satellite areas that it is this Government's position that this is essentially a unilateral Soviet problem, that we are not prepared to negotiate with the Russians over the status of the satellites or of their forces in the satellites in relation to the Western forces in Western Europe?

A. Well, the Soviet Union has always taken the position that this was a matter it could deal with

and it was no matter that they are willing to discuss with us. You will recall at the summit meeting President Eisenhower raised this problem in his opening speech,⁶ and Chairman Bulganin in his reply, as they went around the table, said, "This is a matter which we are going to deal with ourselves and we do not admit of any discussions with anybody about it."⁷ Now, that is their decision. If at any time the Soviet Union wanted any more formal expression of our views, we would always be glad to give it to them.

Q. But in the Bulganin, the last Bulganin letter, there was a reference to possible relationship between the Warsaw military setup and NATO. Is this a negotiable possibility from our side?

A. Not in terms of an equating of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, no. That is not the context within which I think the problem ought to be discussed because the Warsaw Pact is totally different from NATO. We would not want to recognize or seem to give sanctity to that Warsaw Pact, which in fact is not a device for providing mutual security for those countries but is a device for perpetuating Soviet control over those countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your considered judgment, is there hope for a peaceful settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, in the near future, in view of the continued refusal of these neighbors to recognize Israel's sovereignty, and if so, in what way can the United States prove a helpful force for peace?

A. Certainly the United States has hope for a settlement of the political problems, economic problems, refugee problems, and the like in that area. Our basic position remains pretty much the same, or I think I can say the same, as was expressed in the speech on this subject which I made on the 26th of August of last year.⁸ Of course, events since then have led to our hopes being considerably deferred. And the atmosphere at the present moment is not, I'm afraid, conducive to bringing about such a settlement at an early date. But the efforts of the United States will continue to be made for a settlement along the lines of my August 26th statement.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 171.

⁷ For text of Mr. Bulganin's opening address at the Geneva summit conference, see *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046), p. 35.

⁸ BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

Additional U.S. Contribution to U.N. for Hungarian Refugees

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated December 15

The President announced today that the United States will contribute \$4 million to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be used for assistance to Hungarian refugees.

The contribution is in response to a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly and a joint appeal for help issued by the Secretary-General and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [see below].

An earlier United States contribution of \$1 million was made to the United Nations for the same purpose on November 13, 1956.¹ Since that time, the influx of refugees from Hungary into Austria has continued, and more than 130,000 have escaped into Austria from their homeland.

The additional contribution of \$4 million from the United States will assist the Austrian Government, working in cooperation with the High Commissioner, the International Red Cross, and other intergovernmental and voluntary agencies, in meeting the heavy demands placed upon the Republic of Austria by the arrival of these refugees.

In announcing this contribution, the President said that the U.S. Government was proud to join with other governments, through the United Nations, in providing additional means to carry on the humanitarian work of assistance to the Hungarian refugees. He also expressed admiration for the generous and efficient assistance being given the refugees by the Federal Government of Austria and by intergovernmental and private organizations.

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.²

It gives me great pleasure to present to you this check of \$4 million as a contribution by the United States Government for aid to Hungarian refugees. It comes in response to the resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly

¹ U.S./U.N. press release 2515 (not printed).

² Made on presenting the second U.S. contribution for Hungarian refugee relief to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on Dec. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 2560).

and to the subsequent appeals made by you and the High Commissioner for Refugees asking governments and organizations to contribute generously.

Over 130,000 men, women, and children have so far fled from their homeland; their plight is serious and their care is a legitimate concern of all United Nations members. These people are only seeking the basic human freedoms declared by the United Nations Charter to be the birthright of all and the basis for an enduring peace.

Because of the heartfelt and efficient assistance being given to the Hungarian refugees on their arrival in Austria by the Austrian people through their Government and the various humanitarian organizations there, we expect that a very large part of our contribution will go to the Austrian Government.

And I would like to add this further thought: While the United States Government has now contributed \$5 million through the United Nations to aid Hungarian refugees, much more is still needed. The Secretary-General has appealed for a \$10 million fund as a minimum necessary to meet immediate requirements.

I hope that all who sympathize with the gallant people of Hungary will back up their convictions with practical assistance.

TEXTS OF U.N. APPEALS TO GOVERNMENTS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFUGEE AID

Appeal to Governments

U.N. press release dated November 29

Following is the text of a telegram addressed today to all governments members of the United Nations and to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland, the Vatican, and Viet-Nam by the Secretary-General and the United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees.

Please bring following attention your Government:

Wish gratefully acknowledge generous efforts being made by many governments in implementation of Gen-Assembly resolution A/Res/398³ concerning assistance to refugees from Hungary, and have honour request that immediate attention be given subsequent resolution A/Res/-409⁴ adopted by GenAssembly on 21 November at its eleventh session and transmitted by me to your Permanent Representative on 26 November. This resolution urges governments and non-governmental organizations "To

make contributions to the SecGen, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or other appropriate agencies for the care and resettlement of Hungarian refugees and to coordinate their aid programmes in consultation with the Office of the High Commissioner."

A situation of the utmost urgency has now developed. In a communication to the SecGen, the Permanent Representative of Austria to UNations wrote on 26 November "The Hungarians streaming into Austria at the present time arrive deprived of any means and in a state of exhaustion. They have to be cared for immediately, to be fed and clothed. The Austrian Federal Government, in cooperation with everyone willing to help, is undertaking all possible efforts to accommodate these unfortunate people as quickly as possible. But, in spite of all the desperate efforts on the part of the Austrian authorities and the Austrian people to cope with this difficult problem, Austria cannot do it alone. She necessarily depends on generous joint immediate help from other countries." The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees in a report (Document A/3371) submitted on 19 November estimated original cost of care for refugees then expected to remain in Austria for six months. At that time, only some thirtyfour thousand refugees had arrived and minimum number expected to remain for six months was estimated at twenty thousand. As of 28 November, the Office of the High Commissioner reports that approximately ninetytwo thousand arrivals had so far been recorded, as against approximately twentytwo thousand departures. The High Commissioner's original estimate of the number of refugees likely to remain in Austria therefore requires substantial upward revision, bearing in mind the time element involved in completing arrangements for resettlement, and the reluctance of many refugees to move again pending clarification of the situation in their home country. In light of information available at that time, original estimate of High Commissioner's office was that 6,530,000 dollars would be minimum sum required to provide for expected twenty thousand refugees in Austria during six months, in addition to aid provided on emergency basis by Red Cross and other agencies. Already on 21 November, the growing influx of refugees made it necessary to submit an addendum to this original report and estimate pointing out that it was obvious that original figures no longer applied and concluding "Any appeal following GenAssembly action would have to be based on new estimates."

While it is still not possible to estimate exactly dimensions of problem over next six months, it is now considered in light of present information as to number of refugees in Austria and those likely to be moved elsewhere in immediate future, and offers of assistance already communicated to the SecGen and the Deputy High Commissioner, that not less than a further ten million dollars will be required for meeting minimum needs for estimated sixty thousand Hungarian refugees for next six months.

We would therefore be grateful to receive at your earliest convenience an indication of any further assistance you are prepared in this emergency to make available to the SecGen or to the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. We would request precise indications of the nature and extent of such assistance, whether in cash or in the form of temporary asylum or resettlement offers.

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 807.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1956, p. 871.

Dag Hammarskjöld SecGen and James Read Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees.

Appeal to Nongovernmental Organizations

U.N. press release dated November 29

Following is the text of a letter sent today to non-governmental organizations active in aiding refugees by Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary in charge of relief to the Hungarian people, and James M. Read, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees.

We wish to draw your attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 409, adopted by the General Assembly on 21 November 1956, relating to the situation of refugees from Hungary.

A copy of this resolution is enclosed.

The paragraphs referred to read as follows:

"3. Urges governments and non-governmental organizations to make contributions to the Secretary-General, to the High Commissioner for Refugees or to other appropriate agencies for the care and resettlement of Hungarian refugees, and to coordinate their aid programmes in consultation with the Office of the High Commissioner;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Refugees to make an immediate appeal to both governments and non-governmental organizations to meet the minimum present needs as estimated in the report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees to the Secretary-General and authorizes them to make subsequent appeals on the basis of plans and estimates made by the High Commissioner with the concurrence of his Executive Committee."

An urgent appeal for contributions for aid to Hungarian refugees over the next six months has been transmitted to governments.

The appeal stresses not only the extreme urgency of the need but also recognizes the inadequacy of resources available to the Government of Austria for dealing with this problem.

We are gratefully aware of the deep sympathy of organizations and individuals around the world for these new victims of tragedy and express the hope that non-governmental organizations and private citizens will supplement the funds provided by governments with monetary contributions or offers of material aid.

In the light of the needs referred to above, and in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 409, it would be appreciated if non-governmental organizations would inform the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of the nature and extent of any contributions they may be able to make.

We acknowledge with deep gratitude the service to refugees which many voluntary agencies have rendered for a long period of years. While recognizing the great need for the continuation of their long-standing programmes to refugees, we express the confident hope that these agencies will urgently increase their aid programmes so as to render maximum additional help to these new refugees.

Yours sincerely,

PHILIPPE DE SEYNES

Under-Secretary

in charge of Relief

to the Hungarian People

JAMES M. READ

Deputy United Nations

High Commissioner

for Refugees

Interference by Czechoslovak Police With Visitors to U.S. Embassy

Following is the substantive portion of a note sent by the U.S. Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Office on December 7.

It has been noted for some weeks that uniformed police stationed at the entrance to the chancery have been interfering with visitors to the Embassy, requiring them to produce identity documents, making notes from such documents and on occasion questioning them. The interference even extended to American citizens and members of other diplomatic missions in Prague attempting to enter the chancery.

The Embassy considers this action entirely unwarranted and requests that action be taken to bring about its prompt termination.

Representatives of American Presidents To Hold Second Meeting

Press release 630 dated December 21

The State Department announced on December 21 that the next meeting of the Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives will convene in Washington on January 28, 1957. Official notification of the date has been sent to all representatives of the American Presidents by the Committee's secretariat, which is located in the Department of State.

The Committee was formed as a result of the proposal advanced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at the Panama Meeting of American Presidents last July.¹ At that time the Presidents agreed to name personal representatives to form a committee for the purpose of drawing up recommendations on strengthening the Organization of American States through increased activities in the economic, social, financial, technical, and atomic energy fields.

The representative of the President of the United States is Milton S. Eisenhower, president of the Johns Hopkins University, who was elected chairman of the Committee at its first session, held at Washington September 17-19, 1956.²

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 6, 1956, p. 219.

² For text of communique issued following the first session, see *ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1956, p. 513.

Mutual Security and Soviet Foreign Aid

by Philander P. Claxton, Jr.

*Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations*¹

Until the events of the last few weeks in Eastern Europe and the Middle East there seemed to be, since the death of Stalin and particularly since the summit meeting a year ago and the 20th Party Congress last February, a new trend in Soviet foreign policy. This new trend was apparent in all East-West relations as a marked campaign to make the declared Soviet policy of "competitive coexistence" seem plausible. It was particularly apparent in Soviet policies and behavior toward the so-called underdeveloped countries, especially certain countries of Asia, where the Sino-Soviet bloc countries have been engaged in an unprecedented drive to establish good relations by offers of increased trade, credits, and technical assistance.

My purpose tonight is to examine with you the main outlines of this new Soviet economic diplomacy—and its significance to our friends in the world and to ourselves—as it has developed over the last 3 years. The indications have been that the new policy of economic penetration was intended to be of some extended duration. I believe that for the purpose of this evening's discussion—as well as for tentative planning purposes—it may be considered as still underlying the present violence. It must be recognized, however, that Soviet behavior in Hungary and in the Middle East crisis suggests that Soviet diplomacy may be entering a new, tougher phase which would require substantial revision of this assumption.

Let us consider first the magnitude and form of the Sino-Soviet bloc's economic offensive.

¹ Address made before the 9th annual cross-examination tournament at the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Dec. 7.

There have been three principal economic means which the bloc has employed to expand its ties with free-world countries: (1) its trade-promotion drive, (2) its offers of credit, and (3) its technical assistance.

Trade-Promotion Drive

The trade-promotion drive by the end of August of this year had achieved 203 trade and payments agreements between bloc and nonbloc countries. This represented nearly double the number of such agreements in force at the end of 1953, with most of the increase accounted for by underdeveloped countries. These bilateral agreements generally specify the level of trade and types of commodities for which the two countries will provide official trading facilities. They do not assure that trade will reach the specified levels, and in actual practice exchanges have often been much lower.

However, bloc trade with the free world during the first quarter of this year was moving at an annual rate of over \$5 billion, of which \$1.5 billion was with the underdeveloped countries. On the bloc side, the European satellites accounted for a little over half of the trade; the U.S.S.R., one-third; and Communist China, 15 percent. Bloc trade with the underdeveloped countries is distributed as follows: countries in South Asia and the Far East, 22 percent; those in the Middle East and independent Africa, 28 percent; Latin America, 30 percent; and the underdeveloped countries of nonbloc Europe, 20 percent. In all regions the percentage gains over the level of trade 2 years ago are substantial. On the other hand, there are relatively few countries where

bloc trade represents as much as 10 percent of total foreign trade of the free country. The notable exceptions are Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iceland, Burma, Egypt, and Turkey, and in some instances these countries have for some years had fairly significant trading relations with the bloc.

In its trade drive, the bloc has capitalized on the desire of underdeveloped countries to expand their foreign markets for their major products and to stabilize their export earnings. It has widely publicized its willingness to take surplus commodities on long-term contracts and has given the impression that it is sometimes willing to pay premium prices. In return it offers manufactured goods of types which are not produced in adequate quantity in underdeveloped countries and are urgently needed to meet the targets of ambitious economic development programs.

Trade promotion has been pushed energetically through diplomatic channels as well as large numbers of traveling missions and an increasing number of permanent trade offers. Bloc use of local advertising media has expanded noticeably in Latin America and the Near East, and participation in trade fairs has grown impressively. This year bloc countries are expected to participate in 131 fairs and exhibitions in 37 free-world countries. Unlike most of the earlier bloc efforts, in which general trade offers reflected propaganda objectives more than any real desire to do business, the present campaign appears to represent a serious drive to expand markets for a wide variety of bloc products.

While these efforts must be credited with a considerable degree of success, the sailing has not been entirely smooth. For example, some of the underdeveloped countries which have sold or bartered their products to the bloc countries have been disillusioned to find that the bloc countries have thus put the same goods back in the market in competition with the original seller! More important is the growing recognition throughout the free world of the inflexibility and other disadvantages of bloc barter trading. In addition much of the optimism regarding sales to the Communists at favorable prices has proved unwarranted. The Soviets are generally hard traders. This is illustrated by the Burmese experience. Burma's rice crop is its major foreign-exchange earner. Burma was delighted when the bloc offered to buy its surplus rice in barter for goods produced by bloc members. This arrangement, originally

hailed as a great benefit to Burma, has turned out to be anything but a gain, since the products offered in return by the bloc are overpriced and have not always been of the types which the Burmese wanted most urgently. In Latin America, as another example, the countries with the largest exports to the bloc have found themselves in the position of creditors since the goods offered by the bloc have had relatively limited appeal to their importers.

Foreign Lending by U. S. S. R.

Let us now turn from the trade promotion aspect of the new Soviet economic diplomacy to its most dramatic feature: the large-scale entry into the foreign lending field. After years of denouncing foreign aid as an unvarnished instrument of Western imperialism, the U.S.S.R. and European satellites have now signed agreements to extend to 11 underdeveloped countries about \$1.4 billion in credit for the purchase of Soviet-bloc goods and technical services—including arms. This is more than double the level of a year ago. The largest single beneficiary is Yugoslavia, which, as a Communist country, is a special case. With the exception of Yugoslavia, the emphasis of this lending drive has been on the underdeveloped nations of the Near East and South Asia. Three of these nations, Egypt, India, and Afghanistan, together with Yugoslavia, account for the bulk of the total agreed credits. Credits to India, which have exceeded \$100 million, were raised 2 weeks ago by another \$126 million. Indonesia also has recently accepted an offer of a \$100 million line of credit. In addition, firm offers totaling about \$150 million are under consideration by other underdeveloped countries. The U.S.S.R. is providing a little over half of the credits extended and the European satellites the remainder. Recently, even Communist China entered the foreign-assistance field with agreements to provide grants to Cambodia and Nepal. But grants are the exception. Soviet-bloc aid is practically all in the form of credits; and, in at least one case where a gift was involved, the recipient at the same time gave the U.S.S.R. a return gift.

Major emphasis is placed on the claim that these credits have "no strings," and the appeal of the credits is enhanced by the fact that they ordinarily carry an interest rate of only 2 to 2.5 percent. Moreover, the bloc's terms usually provide for repayment in local currency or commodities.

This feature, however, may hold some later surprises to diminish the early joy of the borrowers. No prices have been agreed on for the commodities to be furnished as repayment, and if the Soviets should choose to drive a hard bargain, the gains from low interest rates could prove highly illusory.

The composition of Soviet-bloc credits reveals a fairly wide variety of projects for developing industry, power, transport, and mineral resources as well as facilities for scientific research and education. Several important agreements involve military items and training. For example: In the case of Egypt, bloc members are supplying in part under credit arrangements substantial quantities of arms, a ceramics factory, a power plant, large bridges, railway engines, coaches and freight cars, and other heavy equipment. In the case of Afghanistan, bloc countries are providing, also in part under credit terms, construction of automotive maintenance shops, an irrigation system, two airports, some oil storage depots, a cement plant, water-supply improvement, and a variety of small industrial plants. In each case the project has been skillfully devised to have a particular appeal to the recipient country, and it must be recognized that, initially at least, the psychological impact of the assistance has been substantial. This, of course, illustrates one of the main features of Soviet tactics: Since the Kremlin's purpose is to achieve political objectives and it has no real desire to promote balanced long-term growth in nonbloc areas, it has not insisted on economic justification for projects. The bloc may even consider that its economic leverage will be increased in countries which borrow more than they will be able to repay. However, again we should not underestimate the favorable impression which the Soviets have made on most of the recipients by the speed with which they have completed loan negotiations and moved to implement agreements, and by the quality of equipment and technical service furnished thus far.

Technical Assistance Programs

The third instrument used by the bloc in its economic offensive is its program of technical assistance to certain underdeveloped countries. Although still small by U.S. standards, these activities have been increasing steadily, and bloc technicians are now at work in 14 different under-

developed countries performing a wide variety of technical services. In Egypt, Afghanistan, India, Burma, and other underdeveloped countries, bloc technicians are assisting in local economic-development projects, such as mining, transportation, heavy industry, and manufacturing, and sometimes appear in general advisory capacities to governments. Arms experts from the bloc have appeared in Egypt. Moreover, a growing number of individuals from underdeveloped countries have accepted Communist inducements to go to the bloc countries for training. It should not be assumed that this program is merely a disguised espionage operation. On the other hand, we can assume that no opportunity will be lost for trying to create a favorable disposition toward the Soviet system.

While the Soviets have been expanding their direct technical-assistance activities, they have also reversed their former policy of refusing to participate in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program.

Since the summer of 1953, the Soviet bloc has contributed \$5.2 million to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program. Of the total bloc contribution of \$5.2 million, the U.S.S.R. has made available \$4 million.

The bloc contributions have been used for the supply of bloc equipment and experts, for study tours, and for fellowships within the Soviet bloc. In 1955 approximately \$1.3 million was spent, almost all of which was for the supply of bloc equipment. For 1956, projects are approved which use approximately \$3.2 million, of which about \$1.8 million is for roadbuilding, insect control, and other types of equipment. Six study tours are scheduled, and 41 experts are to be supplied by the bloc under the 1956 United Nations program. The most ambitious project using bloc technical-assistance funds, however, is the technological institute in Bombay sponsored by the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), for which the U.S.S.R. is providing \$1.5 million.

All of these activities represent significant changes in the bloc's pattern of behavior in the foreign economic field up to the death of Stalin. Why have the Soviet Union and its satellites now undertaken them? Is the explanation economics? Let us consider first the expansion of trade. The goal of economic self-sufficiency, or autarchy, has traditionally been a paramount factor in Soviet

planning, and it is still too early to conclude that bloc planners have changed their economic thinking in any radical way. However, some greater degree of flexibility rather than rigid adherence to the self-sufficiency concept is apparent. Since trade is still very small in relation to bloc gross national product, we may well see a continuing bloc effort to increase trade with nonbloc countries substantially above current levels. However, it is still most unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would willingly allow trade to reach a point where any important sector of the economy becomes dependent on foreign supplies.

Political Aspects of Economic Offensive

It is more difficult to find a convincing economic rationale for the bloc's external-credit programs. The goods and services provided under these programs represent a diversion of resources which may eventually be repaid, but it is difficult to imagine that the program has much appeal to the huge areas within the bloc which are still very much underdeveloped. Some observers have speculated that, since the loans are to be repaid in commodities, the bloc may be attempting to assure its future supplies of such items. In other cases credits may be considered necessary as a means of entering new markets traditionally oriented to the West. Such considerations cannot be ruled out completely, but they do not provide any satisfactory explanation for the type and size of program undertaken in the past 2 years. For these answers we must turn to the political sphere and examine the economic offensive in the broader context of overall Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy.

Since Stalin's death Communist strategy abroad has been significantly altered. Especially since the summit meeting in 1955, the U.S.S.R. has seemed anxious to avoid a general war, no doubt in recognition of the almost unlimited destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin has not only modified the tone of its propaganda and official statements in the direction of greater emphasis on peaceful coexistence; it has encouraged cultural and technical exchanges with Western countries; it has granted greater freedom to Western tourists and correspondents; and Soviet leaders like Bulganin and Khrushchev made ostensibly friendly visits to a number of non-Communist countries. After years of delay a peace treaty

was concluded with Austria, and overtures were made to bring Yugoslavia back into the Communist fold. Finally, at the 20th Party Congress Stalin was expressly denounced and the doctrine of separate national roads to socialism was proclaimed.

What we saw then was a Soviet communism anxious to avoid war but nevertheless bent, as before, on expansion—expansion by means still aimed at the overthrow of existing institutions but carrying a minimum risk of forceful retaliation by non-Communist countries. Such a policy must find expression on many levels other than military. Even though the U.S.S.R. continues to put vast resources of materials and technology into the arms race and Soviet theoreticians are occupied in trying to reconcile peaceful coexistence with the revolutionary nature of communism, its external policies strive to convince the world that the U.S.S.R. is peaceful.

In the underdeveloped areas, the U.S.S.R. has promoted its campaign for respectability by a wide variety of new as well as old-fashioned kinds of diplomacy. One weapon of Soviet strategy in these areas is anticolonialism, a hypocritical opposition to the colonial policies—past and present—of the Western powers, and an attempt to associate the U.S.S.R. with the legitimate national aspirations of colonial and newly independent peoples. Offers of arms to Egypt, Afghanistan, and Syria may actually be intended to foment local hostilities in the Middle East, but they are represented as demonstrating the U.S.S.R.'s desire to assist these countries in their fight against colonialism.

Next to nationalism, the dominant motivation of the governments and peoples of most underdeveloped countries is their desire for economic progress—generally at a rate more rapid than their domestic resources can support. The Soviet purpose seems to be to convince these peoples that a free private-enterprise system cannot provide rapid economic growth whereas, by following the Soviet model, industrialization can be achieved quickly, without remaining or becoming subservient to Western capitalism. In Marxist theory and propaganda, capitalism has always been identified with colonialism, and the underdeveloped countries, especially the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, are urged to reject both.

How should we consider these Soviet economic activities? Intrinsically they are not wrong or

dangerous. The U.S. has made substantial contributions to the economic growth of the less developed areas and has encouraged other countries to do likewise. Moreover, we have eagerly sought the elimination of the Iron Curtain between the Communist bloc and the free world and would hope that honest economic contacts could help to achieve this result. The danger becomes evident only when we examine the *objectives* and *motives* that so plainly underlie Soviet economic offers and all other Soviet maneuvers.

Mr. Khrushchev himself has provided the free world with a clear warning in his frank statement to the Supreme Soviet early this year: "... we never renounced," he said, "and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the victory of communism." At another time he said—no more plainly but a little more colorfully—that the U.S.S.R. will stop being Communist when shrimp learn to whistle.

Does the danger in the Soviet economic offensive lie then merely in the fact that it may serve Soviet interests? I think not. Our aid programs are also intended to serve our proper national interest. But, as Secretary Dulles said several months ago: "... the crucial question is: What are those interests and how are they intended to be served?"² He added:

Our interests will be fully served if other nations maintain their independence and strengthen their free institutions. We have no further aims than these. We want a world environment of freedom. We have shown this, time after time, by electing to give freedom where we could have had conquest. Our historic policy, reflecting the will and the views of our own free people, is wholly compatible with the interests of the less developed countries as their leaders themselves have expressed them.

Implications for U.S. Policy

How seriously must we take this new Communist strategy? Let me cite the warning of the members of the U.S. delegation to the last meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. After watching the activities of the Soviets and learning the reactions of representatives of other countries they issued this statement:³

The present period in history may one day be recognized as a major turning point in the struggle between Communism and freedom. It appears to be clearly a

shift in the cold war, in which economic and social problems have moved to the forefront. . . .

We believe that the United States must counter these Soviet efforts. We can succeed, not by outbidding Communism in sheer amounts of economic aid, but by making newly independent and newly articulate peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of the community of free nations.

We welcome more emphasis on economic and educational endeavors, for we have a proven experience in these fields.

We are in a contest in the field of economic development of underdeveloped countries which is bitterly competitive. Defeat in this contest could be as disastrous as defeat in an armaments race.

We could lose this economic contest unless the country as a whole wakes up to all its implications.

It is significant that two members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives [Representatives Brooks Hays and Chester E. Merrow] were on the delegation which made this statement and that it was later released to the public by Secretary Dulles with the approval of President Eisenhower.

We need have no concern that the leaders of the newly independent nations of the Near and Far East will be unaware of the dangers of economic dependence on the Soviet Union. At the same time their people are insistent upon progress toward higher standards of living. They know that in the short space of their own lives the Soviet Union has risen from a backward area to a great industrial power. They are perhaps only dimly aware of the cost of this achievement in human misery and loss of liberty. They see and they envy and admire the industrial progress. They want to equal it in their own nations. They will inevitably compel their leaders to turn to the Communist bloc for help unless they find it from another source.

There are, of course, other sources of help available. Private capital investment, with the technical assistance which accompanies it, is and will continue to be a major source. Such lending institutions as our own U.S. Export-Import Bank and the International Bank are also significant sources. Our mutual security program, with its development assistance, technical cooperation, defense support, and military assistance, has been and is an important source of help.

This brings us back to where we started, for the future of this program is now under consideration by a Citizens Advisory Committee appointed by the President, by several of the great committees

² BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

of the Congress, and by the Nation itself as exemplified by the discussions which you have been holding here this week.⁴ I would not suggest for a minute that these reviewers think of our own mutual security program as an item-by-item—or even a generalized—response to the new Soviet economic drive. If anything, the reverse is true—the Soviet effort is a flattering imitation of a bold design we have originated and carried out with great success. The lesson for the future is to be ourselves and to shape our helpful efforts to the genuine needs of our friends. Meanwhile, we may keep in mind as a central thought the words of the President in his message to Congress earlier this year:⁵

“The mutual security program is vitally important to our people. Its cost is not disproportionate to our Nation’s resources and to our national income. That cost is a low price to pay for the security and vastly greater chances for world peace which the program provides.

“The mutual security program is an indispensable part of our national effort to meet affirmatively the challenge of all the forces which threaten the independence of the free world and to overcome the conditions which make peace insecure and progress difficult.”

NATO Council Resolutions

Following are the texts of two resolutions released by the NATO Information Division on December 14 after their adoption by the North Atlantic Council during its Ministerial Session at Paris December 11–14. (For the text of a communique released at the close of the session, see Bulletin of December 24–31, page 981.)

Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Differences Between Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

WHEREAS the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article I of that treaty, have undertaken “to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered”;

⁴ For an account of the studies being made, see “Foreign Aid Under the Microscope,” by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, *ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1956, p. 723.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1956, p. 550.

WHEREAS the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;

WHEREAS NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields;

The North Atlantic Council:

REAFFIRMS the obligations of all its members, under Article I of the Treaty, to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

DECIDES that any such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before member governments resort to any other international agency except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organizations;

RECOGNISES the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

EMPOWERS the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;

AUTHORISES the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph to use the assistance of not more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.

Resolution on the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO

WHEREAS the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on 5th May established a Committee composed of the foreign ministers of Italy, Canada and Norway to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;

WHEREAS the Committee of Three has now reported on the task assigned to it and has submitted to the Council a number of recommendations on such ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields;

The North Atlantic Council:

TAKES NOTE of the Report of the Committee of Three and

APPROVES its recommendations; and

INVITES the Council in Permanent Session to implement in the light of the comments made by governments the principles and recommendations contained in the Report; and

INVITES the Secretary General to draw up for consideration by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for the implementation of these recommendations and to report periodically on the compliance with these recommendations by governments.

AUTHORISES the Committee of Three to publish their report.

Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO

Following is the text of the report made to the North Atlantic Council by the Committee of Three (Foreign Ministers Gaetano Martino of Italy, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Lester B. Pearson of Canada) as released by the NATO Information Division at Paris on December 14, at the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council meeting.

Chapter 1: General Introduction

The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, set up by the North Atlantic Council at its session of May, 1956, was requested: "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it (1) to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and (2) to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries; thereby facilitating and encouraging steps to lessen international tension. The events of the last few months have increased this tension and reduced hopes, which had been raised since Stalin's death, of finding a secure and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for co-operative coexistence with the Communist world. The effort to this end, however, must go on.

4. Inter-allied relations have also undergone severe strains. The substance of this report was prepared by the Committee of Three in the course of its meetings and inter-governmental consultations last September. Subsequent events have reinforced the Committee's conviction that the Atlantic Community can develop greater unity only by working constantly to achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. Unless this is done, the very framework of co-operation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered.

5. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence: to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all, which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to overlook the far-reaching importance

of this commitment; especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.

6. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter; as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it signed the Pact; providing also—and recent events have shown that this is equally important—that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.

7. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.

8. This is our best present deterrent against military aggression; and consequently the best assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged.

9. However, this deterrent role of NATO, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members are co-operative and close. An Alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.

10. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO unity and understanding, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organization.

11. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective response—we had learned that a purely national response was insufficient for security—to the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength. The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the pressure against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.

12. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the realisation—conscious or instinctive—that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual protection should also promote progress and co-operation generally. There was a feeling among the governments and peoples concerned, that this closer unity was both natural and desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who challenged them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their defence but for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community, alongside the realisation of an immediate common danger.

13. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive or even the main impulse in the creation of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being.

14. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand design of an Atlantic Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever.

15. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognized that while defence co-operation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.

16. These two aspects of security—civil and military—can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential inter-relationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

17. North Atlantic political and economic co-operation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments—especially the more powerful ones—are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and through

NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

18. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of non-military co-operation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

19. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-assessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin, and of the effect of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe on this development.

20. These changes have not diminished the need for collective military defence but they have faced NATO with an additional challenge in which the emphasis is largely non-military in character. NATO must recognize the real nature of the developments which have taken place. An important aspect of the new Soviet policies of competitive coexistence is an attempt to respond to positive initiatives of the Western nations aimed at improving, in an atmosphere of freedom, the lot of the economically less developed countries, and at establishing a just and mutually beneficial trading system in which all countries can prosper. The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed to ensnare these countries by economic means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving to release themselves. The members of NATO must maintain their vigilance in dealing with this form of penetration.

21. Meanwhile some of the immediate fears of large-scale all out military aggression against Western Europe have lessened. This process has been facilitated by evidence that the Soviet Government have realised that any such all out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation, and that there could be no victory in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides. With an increased Soviet emphasis on non-military or para-military methods, a review is needed of NATO's ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the guise of coexistence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe.

22. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO's needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the Organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: "Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?"

23. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.

24. The first of these objectives—as has already been pointed out—is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.

25. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remain as essential as they were in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed; but Soviet armed might and ultimate objectives remain unchanged. Moreover, recent events in Eastern Europe show that the Soviet Union will not hesitate in certain circumstances to use force and the threat of force. Therefore the military strength of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to—not a substitute for—continuous co-operation in defence.

26. In spite of these recent events Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. There is no evidence, however, that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

27. We should welcome changes in Soviet policies if they were genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remember that the weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal. We must therefore remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.

28. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.

29. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the Alliance. NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of its enemies. It has faltered at times through the lethargy or complacency of its members; through dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. It could be destroyed by these forces, if they were allowed to subsist. To combat these tendencies, NATO must be used by its members, far more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and cooperation on questions of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than resolutions; will than words.

30. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary doctrines of Communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions over Communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and

orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these Communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

31. We must, however, realise that falsehoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even in the non-Communist world, who under the systematic influence of Communist propaganda, do not accept our own analysis of NATO's aims and values. They believe that while NATO may have served a useful defensive and deterrent role in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary, even for the security of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling of the strength and resources of the "colonial" powers in defence of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views to be false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.

32. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonising their policies in relation to other areas taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now divide the world.

33. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to co-operate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place; but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure peace for all nations.

34. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character of any Soviet moves, our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are convinced that conditions of international confidence have been restored, will, particularly after the events in Hungary, be understood by all people of sincerity and good will. What would not be understood is any unwillingness on our part to seek ways and means of breaking down the barriers with a view to establishing such confidence.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes—which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO concept—must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than a contemporary, develop-

ment and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact underlying this development is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and co-operation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.

37. This basic fact underlies our report and the recommendations contained therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect. This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require, above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.

Chapter 2: Political Co-operation

I. INTRODUCTION

39. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political co-operation.

40. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members; for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

41. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

42. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political—or economic—consultation in NATO. It is

difficult and has in fact been shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICIES

A. Scope and Character of Political Consultation

43. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"... The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. . . . In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies as a whole.

"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognised in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

44. These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO we must also recognise that the practice of consulting has not so developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world trends. The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation. There is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.

45. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of harmonising policies. Where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake consultation should al-

ways seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action.

46. Such agreement, even with the closest possible co-operation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.

47. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasise them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimised or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

48. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments. It is conceivable that a situation of extreme emergency may arise when action must be taken by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

49. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the unwisdom, of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail the obligations and duties of consultation. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than dogma.

50. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments, before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by the Council or any Committee of the Council will be of any great value.

51. On the assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are recommended:

(a) members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation;

(b) both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character;

(c) a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible;

(d) in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council;

(e) where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the govern-

ment concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. Annual Political Appraisal

52. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.

53. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report:

(a) analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;

(b) reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems;

(c) indicating the problems and possible developments which may require future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and constructive initiatives taken.

54. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. Preparation for Political Consultation

55. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.

56. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.

III. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-MEMBER DISPUTES

57. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the

North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

(a) reaffirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

(b) declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization;

(c) recognising the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

(d) empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

(e) empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in (d) above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

58. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

59. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

(a) that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings;

(b) that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. In this way the parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.

Chapter 3: Economic Co-operation

I. INTRODUCTION

60. Political co-operation and economic conflict are not

reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

61. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:

(a) co-operative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;

(b) the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long-term capital;

(c) assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and

(d) policies which will demonstrate, under conditions of competitive coexistence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

62. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual effort to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible—as it is desirable—for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and well-being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-Communist world.

II. NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

63. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation.¹ NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the purposes they serve.

¹ The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Co-operation (OEEC) (which includes all NATO countries as full or associate members and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various other United Nations agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). [Footnote in the original.]

64. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concerns of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments where the questions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

65. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonising of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a "bloc" in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be consultation in NATO when economic issues of special political or strategic importance to NATO arise in other organizations and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.

III. CONFLICTS IN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF NATO COUNTRIES

66. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

IV. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

67. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

68. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and

technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilisation of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

69. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

(a) to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving those problems;

(b) to foster closer relations among the participants with a view of continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

(c) to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

V. CONSULTATION ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

70. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels, however, that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concerning the relevant policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field. When required NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

71. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviet bloc countries might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field of competitive economic coexistence

member countries should consult together more fully in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

72. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an *ad hoc* basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted with preliminary discussion, on a systematic basis, of the matters outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties would not be full-time, member governments could be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international economic organizations. Membership, however, should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration.

Chapter 4: Cultural Co-operation

73. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

74. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:

- (a) government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts;
- (b) member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community;
- (c) in developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts;
- (d) there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.

75. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the

Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers.

76. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

77. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July 1956 should be held from time to time.

78. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

79. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.

80. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on "the Role of the School in the Atlantic Community", should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.

Chapter 5: Co-operation in the Information Field

81. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

82. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

83. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provisions in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion

of information about and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

84. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underline the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of Communist moves and statements which affect NATO.

85. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks—and should not be asked to do so.

86. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:

(a) an Officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;

(b) governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;

(c) within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;

(d) NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

87. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.

Chapter 6: Organization and Functions

88. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

89. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. Meetings of the Council

90. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately con-

sidered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

91. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussions, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

92. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required and occasionally in locations other than NATO Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

B. Strengthening the Links Between the Council and Member Governments

93. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interests of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultations into effective action within the national governments.

94. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council meetings with the participation of specially designated officials or the permanent heads of foreign ministries.

C. Preparation for Council Meetings

95. Items on the agenda of Ministerial Meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

96. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisors. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 2, paragraph 56, and Chapter 3, paragraph 72.)

97. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an *ad hoc* basis, to do preparatory work. Informal

discussions among specialists with corresponding responsibilities are a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

98. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO "basic position material" for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

D. The Secretary General and the International Staff

99. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.

100. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in other sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

101. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

102. In addition:

(a) the Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation;

(b) in view of these responsibilities, member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance;

(c) attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General, recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 2, paragraph 52) and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 57).

103. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the efficiency, devotion and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.

PALAIS DE CHAILLOT
Paris, XVIIe.

Annex

Committee of Three Formal Record of Proceedings

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway) and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5th May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"... to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

2. The Committee held its first meetings from 20th to 22nd June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 28th June, 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 20th August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10th September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12th September a. m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H. G. Andersen, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council); p. m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Thursday, 13th September a. m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J. W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs); p. m. Greece (represented by Mr. E. Averof, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Friday, 14th September a. m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P. H. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs); p. m. Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

Monday, 17th September a. m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M. J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs); a. m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs); p. m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower); p. m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Tuesday, 18th September a. m. Denmark (represented by Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister); p. m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs).

5. In addition the Committee met with the following groups:

(a) On Wednesday, 12th September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries, consisting of the following persons:

Belgium-----	Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert
	Mr. A. de Meeler
Canada-----	Senator, the Hon. Wishart McL.
	Robertson, P. C.
France-----	Mr. Maurice Schumann
Germany-----	Herr F. Berendsen
	Dr. Richard Jaeger
Netherlands-----	Mr. J. J. Fens
	Mr. J. L. Kranenburg
	Mr. E. A. Vermeer
Turkey-----	Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek
United Kingdom--	Colonel Walter Elliott, C.H., M.C., M.P.
United States----	Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.

(b) On Saturday, 15th September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:

Count Morra, Chairman
 Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman
 Dr. Flynt, Vice-Chairman and
 Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General
 and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

(c) On Tuesday, 18th September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared. In this work the Committee benefited from the expert advice of three special consultants. They were Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Mr. Robert Major (Oslo).

7. The Committee met again in New York on 14th November and re-examined the report in the light of the important world events which occurred in the interval since its September meeting. The Committee, after approving the report, furnished the other Foreign Ministers with an advance copy, preparatory to consideration of the report by the North Atlantic Council.

British Arrangements With Monetary Fund and Eximbank

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ANNOUNCEMENT, DECEMBER 10

The Government of the United Kingdom has made arrangements with the International Monetary Fund under which it may purchase with sterling, from the Fund, up to the amount of its quota of U.S.\$1,300 million. These arrangements fall into two parts:

- (i) a drawing of U.S.\$561,470,000; and
- (ii) a stand-by arrangement under which up to the equivalent of U.S.\$738,530,000 in foreign currencies may be purchased with sterling at any time during the next twelve months.

The United Kingdom Government purchased a total of U.S.\$300 million from the Fund in 1947 and 1948. These sums have since been fully repaid, partly by repurchase by the United Kingdom and partly by purchases of sterling by other members.

STATEMENT BY IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR PER JACOBSSON, DECEMBER 10

The drawing of \$561,470,000 is intended to add to the monetary reserves of the United Kingdom to meet payments requirements. This amount will be at the immediate disposal of the United Kingdom.

The stand-by arrangement, on the other hand, will make available the equivalent of \$738,530,000 in Fund member currencies to be used at any time during the next twelve months at the request of the United Kingdom, to supplement the amount immediately transferred.

In the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Macmillan, on December 4, and in its representations to the Fund the United Kingdom Government has made clear that it intends to maintain the rate of the pound sterling at its present parity and to avoid the reimposition of external controls. To this end the United Kingdom Government has announced that it will follow fiscal, credit and other policies designed to strengthen the economy, both internally and externally.

The pursuit of such policies will clearly promote the objectives of the Fund. For this reason, and in view of the special importance of sterling as a worldwide reserve and trading currency, the Fund has approved a transaction of this magnitude. It has done so in the firm belief that the action taken will permit the policies and measures of the United Kingdom to continue to operate and thus effectively contribute to the restoration of the strong balance-of-payments position which had been emerging in the first half of 1956.

In this connection it should be pointed out that the trading position of the United Kingdom has been and continues to be essentially sound. In the course of 1956, pressure on the economy was eased under the impact of the monetary and fiscal measures and the benefit of investments over the past few years now coming to fruition. The credit squeeze was showing good results, the rise in prices had been checked, and exports, including those to

the dollar markets, had reached record levels. A state of equilibrium had almost been achieved.

From the end of July, however, the balance-of-payments position came under pressure. The pressure was not caused by weakness in the current account, but reflected a decline in confidence which caused remittances of sterling to be delayed and payments through sterling to be accelerated. Since sterling serves as a means of payments for half the world's commercial transactions, it is a currency particularly susceptible to these influences. It is for the purpose of reversing this trend against a world-wide trading currency that the International Monetary Fund has today approved support on such a massive scale.

EXIMBANK ANNOUNCEMENT, DECEMBER 21

The Export-Import Bank and the British Embassy announced on December 21 that the bank had authorized a line of credit of \$500 million in favor of the British Government to be available for the United Kingdom's dollar requirements for United States goods and services, including dollar requirements for petroleum.

The line of credit will be made against the U.K. Government holding of United States dollar securities. It will be available for a period of 12 months. Repayments will begin 3 years after each disbursement and will be made in semiannual installments over 4½ years thereafter. Interest on each disbursement will be chargeable at 4½ percent, payable semiannually.

U.S. Extends Invitation to Euratom Committee

Press release 629 dated December 21

The Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels on December 21 released the text of a letter from the Secretary of State to Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium and President of the Intergovernmental Conference for the Common Market and EURATOM, together with a translation of the latter's reply, concerning an invitation by the U.S. Government to a group of three distinguished Europeans working on a program of atomic energy development in connection with EURATOM to visit the United States. The texts of the letters follow.

Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Spaak

DECEMBER 10, 1956

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We have noted with great interest the decision of the Brussels Conference to appoint three "Wise Men" whose task it is to establish production targets in the field of nuclear energy for EURATOM, the rate at which nuclear power stations can be installed, and the means and resources needed for the achievement of a common program.

In the past, both the President and I have indicated the sympathetic support of this country for the efforts of the Six Nations to develop an integrated atomic energy community. Not only would a successful EURATOM contribute importantly to the goal of a closer and mutually beneficial association of Western European states, but such a community could do much to further the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the encouragement of which has been a major objective of this country over the last several years.

I would appreciate, therefore, your extending an invitation to the "Wise Men", on behalf of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and myself, to come to the United States in the course of their study in order that United States Government officials and American private groups can assist them in every appropriate way in carrying out their important mission.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

His Excellency

PAUL-HENRI SPAAK,

President of the

Intergovernmental Committee

for the Common Market

and EURATOM,

Brussels.

Mr. Spaak to Secretary Dulles

DECEMBER 19, 1956

MR. SECRETARY: The letter that you kindly sent to me on December 10 has received my full attention. I have brought it to the attention of the Committee of the Chiefs of Delegation of the Conference for the Common Market and EURATOM, which met at Paris on December 13.

The Committee was very pleased at the evidence of interest that the American Government continues to show in the efforts of the Six Nations to

create an atomic community. It decided with pleasure to forward to the three Wise Men the invitation in which you and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission invite them to visit the United States in order to complete their work. I have just learned that Messrs. Etzel, Giordani and Armand¹ gratefully accept this invitation and that they plan to go to the United States during the course of the month of January.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.

P. H. SPAAK

The Honorable

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Colombo Plan Nations Review Economic Progress

Press release 622 dated December 17

Following are the texts of a communique issued on December 8 at Wellington, New Zealand, by the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development of South and Southeast Asia at the conclusion of its eighth meeting, and of an extract from the Committee's annual report. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, headed the U.S. delegation to the Consultative Committee meeting. Member governments of the Committee are: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom together with Malaya and British Borneo, the United States, and Viet-Nam.

COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER 8

1. The eighth meeting of the Consultative Committee, representing the member Governments of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic

¹ Franz Etzel, Vice President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community; Francesco Giordani, President of the Italian National Research Committee and former President of the Italian National Committee for Nuclear Research; Louis Armand, President of the French National Railway System and Chairman of the Industrial Equipment Committee of the French Atomic Energy Commission.

Development in South and South East Asia, was held in Wellington from 4 to 8 December 1956.

2. The meeting reviewed the progress, and considered the problems of development, during the past year, in the countries of the area and surveyed the present economic position of the individual countries, and of the region as a whole. An assessment was made of some of the tasks ahead for the countries of the Colombo Plan in South and South East Asia. A draft report prepared by officials in a preliminary meeting from 19 November to 1 December 1956 was discussed by Ministers who approved the text of the Fifth Annual Report, for publication in member countries' capitals on or after 15 January 1957. The discussions were full, frank and cordial and not the least value of the meeting lay in the friendly personal association between the representatives of the member Governments.

3. In the region as a whole several significant advances were made in both the planning and execution of economic development programmes during the fifth year of the Colombo Plan. In 1955-56, there was progress in the development of the area as a whole, although this progress was not uniform. National income continued to rise at a rate slightly in excess of population growth. Most of the Colombo Plan countries in 1955-56 contributed to and benefited from the continued expansion in world industrial production and trade. Agricultural production, on balance showed a little improvement over the previous year; there was an increase in mining output, particularly in petroleum production in the area. Significant progress was made in industrial production as a result of greater utilization of existing equipment and expanded facilities resulting from new investment.

4. The past year has been, in a measure, a turning point in the progress of the Asian members of the Colombo Plan. Many countries have recently formulated new or renewed national plans and others have given continuing attention to improving the planning and execution of their public investment projects. For 1955-56, the aim was to expend an estimated £791 million on development in the public sector in countries of the area and for 1956-57 it is the intention to raise the level of expenditure by over a quarter. The greater part of this cost of development in the public sector is being provided through the efforts of the people of the area. In addition to governmental

development projects, private investment is making an important contribution especially in agriculture and small-scale industries.

5. In 1955-56 assistance from contributing member governments of the Plan, from international institutions and from other agencies, was greater than in previous years and the rate at which it was used on specific projects was accelerated. External capital assistance in addition to supplementing the countries' own resources has a value of generating further domestic investment. It was recognized that there is an important place for private external investment as a means of obtaining capital inflow, particularly because of the technical knowledge it brings with it and its flexibility.

6. One of the main obstacles to balanced economic development in the Colombo Plan area is the lack of skilled personnel. Much can be done through capital projects to raise productivity, but without adequate technical skills the fullest use may not be made of new possibilities opened up by higher soil fertility, electric power and new machinery. The main emphasis in improving social services such as health and education, too, must lie with trained staff, helped by modern equipment. For these reasons, successive meetings of the Consultative Committee have stressed the need for the training of students of the area in the more developed countries and the sending of experts to the area. The committee found this year that one of the fruits of the Colombo Plan has been the ability of some countries of the area to send experts to, and receive trainees from their neighbours, and noted that additional opportunities for such intra regional assistance will increase, as development progresses and more experience is obtained.

7. Since 1950, technical assistance has been extended to approximately 11,000 trainees, while about 4,000 experts have been provided.

8. The Committee took note of the progress reported by the United States on a proposal for a regional nuclear center to be located in Manila.¹ The United States informed the committee of the future steps to be taken in consultation with the members of the Colombo Plan; it was also indicated that the United States was prepared to contribute approximately \$20 million to the estab-

lishment of the center subject to mutually satisfactory arrangements being worked out with other participating countries. Canada reported on progress in the construction of the Canada-India Reactor. This Reactor is being established at the Indian Atomic Energy Research Centre near Bombay.

9. Two major aspects of development during the period under review were noted: first, the endeavours of countries to attain higher rates of economic growth while preserving the economic and social stability required to make that growth continuous and its results enduring; and second, the need for flexibility in the execution of plans. In some countries, post-war rehabilitation is still to be completed, or other difficulties are still to be overcome, and it is only now that they are beginning to find themselves in a position to formulate development plans. For others, the task is now to move forward from the economic and social basis already provided by their own efforts and by cooperation within the Colombo Plan.

10. These and other problems in the tasks ahead have been discussed in the Annual Report for 1956. Member governments of the Colombo Plan are confident that their friendly and willing co-operation will continue in facing the difficulties and challenges that lie ahead in the building of a new life for the countries of South and South East Asia.

EXTRACT FROM ANNUAL REPORT

SOME TASKS AHEAD

1. The Annual Reports of the Consultative Committee review the general economic situation and development progress and prospects of South and South East Asia. Such reviews of the past and assessments of the future focus attention on certain problems relating to the future development of the countries of the area which warrant consideration.

2. The 1955 Annual Report,² for instance, found wide differences in the economic situation of the countries of the area, that much development work remained to be done, that while the need for external resources remained, the problem of mobilising domestic resources was of paramount importance, and that certain economic problems, common to the region, had been thrown into sharper focus. These issues were broadly stated and drawn out in a necessarily tentative way; only the passage of time would permit more definite conclusions.

3. Another year of experience makes it possible to

¹For text of a statement made by Mr. Robertson at the meeting, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1956, p. 957.

²For an extract from this report, see *ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 995.

delineate issues further and draw provisional conclusions regarding some of the problems common to the area. These may be summarized as follows:

(a) While further progress in the economic growth of the region has been made in the past year countries have become aware of the increasing need for maintaining flexibility in furthering their development programmes, while consolidating existing gains.

(b) In spite of considerable economic growth in past years, the problem of developing sufficient opportunities for productively employing the ever increasing human resources of the area remains.

(c) Varying stages and forms of development and the wide range of experience within the region provide new opportunities for cooperation among the countries of South and South East Asia.

(d) Future development will tend to require more complex and difficult decisions in such matters as the extent to which the fruits of development can and should be devoted to consumption rather than investment, the pattern of investment, and the impact of a country's development programme upon its external situation and the economic life of other countries.

(e) The task ahead will require the mobilization of additional developmental energies in both the public and the private sectors.

(f) While the flow of external resources to the countries in the region has so far been largely in forms of grants, increased opportunities may develop for drawing on foreign private investment and on public and private loans as sources of external capital.

4. The years ahead will require increasing attention to the problems of maintaining flexibility in development programmes while consolidating existing advances and continuing development. For many countries in South and South East Asia, the economic growth process has involved the planning and programming of resources over long periods of time. The implementation of programmes, however, is dependent upon the availability of requisite resources at the right time, in the right place, and in the right combination. Sometimes these resources are not available because of crop failures, foreign exchange stringencies, and unforeseen shortages of equipment and skilled personnel. Under these circumstances, there is a need for flexibility in programmes. Plans provide a broad framework of overall objectives as flexible guides to future policies and action. Constant vigilance will be required to ensure that appropriate adjustments are made to meet changed conditions. It is also necessary in this connection to refer to the possibility of taking steps towards the building of defences within the economies of the countries of the region to enable them to sustain their development despite short-term upsets like drought, floods etc.

5. Countries in the region may find it necessary to give increasing attention not only to flexibility in the implementation of programmes, but also to the more general problem of consolidating existing achievements while continuing to move forward.

6. Countries of the area also find it necessary to devote increasing attention to creating new opportunities for employing their expanding labour force. Available information tends to indicate that development progress may

not be providing employment opportunities commensurate with the growth of the labour force. On the other hand, employment opportunities provided by development may not be fully utilized because of the limited availability of necessary skills and talents in the labour force. Future programmes, recognizing both the social and economic exigencies of the situation, are seeking to devote increased attention to creating additional work facilities for the presently unemployed or under-employed, as well as providing needed training for an expanding labour force. Some countries may seek a partial solution to this current and long-term problem through increased emphasis upon industrialisation and greater labour mobility; others may concentrate on additional work opportunities for under-employed agricultural workers; others may devote a portion of their development efforts to projects employing a great deal of labour. The means and varied possible approaches to resolve this difficult situation will, in the years ahead, provide an additional body of common experience upon which all countries may be able to draw.

7. Development progress in South and South East Asia, provides a wide range of experience differing from country to country. Some countries, for example, are well advanced in the implementation of long-range development programmes. Others are still engaged in the initial task of assessing resources and determining programme priorities. Continued developmental efforts and progress under differing situations in the countries of the area have produced, in a number of ways, opportunities for interchanges of mutual interest. Some countries have successfully utilised a particular approach or overcome an important obstacle which other countries are about to encounter in some phase of their development. Beginnings have already been made in exchanging experiences in the resolution of particular problems. It is noted, for instance, that one country of the area which has pioneered in community development projects is now responding to the request of another member for assistance in initiating such a programme.

8. Another beginning in the interchange of experience within the area is in the field of training and education. Countries of the area are developing skills and training of interest to each other. This experience is, in many instances, already being shared with others in the area. In some cases, the various experience or techniques developed within the area may have greater applicability and effectiveness than similar experience obtained elsewhere. Out of these opportunities provided by a growing body of economic experience within the area, it may be found that assistance for many of South and South East Asia's development problems can come from the region itself.

9. The informal consultation which has been pursued for many years in Consultative Committee meetings can further assist in this process. Continuing progress in all countries will provide further ideas and problems which can be exchanged profitably with other member countries. Increasingly, aid-recipient countries of the area are also becoming aid-donor countries, particularly in the field of technical assistance. No clear pattern has emerged as to the ultimate extent or intensity of such mutual cooperation but it appears that an opportunity is present in which all could participate and from which all could gain. It

is clear that there is considerable scope for greater regional cooperation in South and South East Asia.

10. The experience of the past year has confirmed once again the importance of viewing the process of development and implementation of programmes in the broadest possible context. Programmes for expanding economic growth are generally conceived in terms of stated objectives relating to the internal economic situation, such as percentage increases in national income, production targets, employment opportunities, and export availabilities. While in many instances the validity of these objectives is derived from important domestic considerations, their realization is often dependent upon external factors beyond the control of the developing country. Many countries of the area find that effective development therefore requires consideration of the proposed programme in a broad setting. On the one hand, there is the genuine desire on the part of many countries to undertake industrialization in order to utilize locally available material resources and to create new employment opportunities. There is a natural and laudable desire on the part of countries to diversify in order to achieve a balanced economy. On the other hand, there is the problem of equating internal programmes with external resources availabilities in such a way as to achieve objectives without engendering critical balance of payments difficulties. It should be borne in mind that any development programmes which lead to an impairment of the export earnings of a country or the prosperity of its trading partners are likely to be self-defeating in the long run. The past decade has witnessed an increasingly discernible movement towards higher levels of world trade. Development can aid this movement and profit from it. In the years ahead, as the Colombo Plan countries of South and South East Asia, with more than one-fourth of the world's population, undertake larger development programmes, the task of considering programmes from the standpoint of both the internal and external impact will become more necessary and, in some instances, more difficult. It is, however, a consideration essential to sound development progress.

11. The review of the past year has focused attention on the all-important relationship between consumption and investment. In the future, as development outlays increase, the maintenance of a balanced relationship between consumption and investment will have greater importance and become increasingly difficult to achieve. Increased consumption is one of the tangible benefits of development and indeed, in a region with very low levels of living, it may be regarded as an important factor in increasing productivity. Too great an increase in investment without a corresponding increase in consumption tends to create strains and stresses which threaten financial stability, particularly in view of the continuing increase in the population of the region. On the other hand, a point can be reached when too great a consumption increase threatens to curtail investment and the future rate of growth. This problem of devising appropriate fiscal and other measures to permit a reasonable increase in both consumption and investment constitutes one of the most difficult tasks for the Governments of the countries of the region.

12. There is no simple solution for resolving the prob-

lem posed by the respective roles of consumption and investment. Many countries, as part of the initial phase of development, have encouraged investments which, in one way or another, in agriculture or industry, result in the availability of more consumer goods in the short term. With a relatively sound base they have undertaken expenditure on larger, slower-yielding investment projects with a view to promoting a faster pace of development in the future. This emphasis, however, is not adequate in itself and has to be supplemented by corresponding fiscal and other measures. Such measures have an important bearing on the mobilization and allocation of resources in a developing country.

13. The task of mobilising resources is a continuing one. Past experience in the area indicates that early emphasis is on mobilising resources for those projects which the government plans and directs, such as roads and other basic facilities. At the same time, it becomes necessary and desirable to maximise the efforts and productivity of all parts of the economy. It is essential, therefore, to bring forth, through training, administrative and financial measures, a more widespread initiative throughout the economy. This kind of initiative can be stimulated by a variety of means, including effective policies on the part of governments. Establishment or installation of basic facilities will support the economic efforts of individuals, groups and communities. Farm-to-market roads, for instance, will provide increased outlets for greater output by the individual producer. The assured availability of power can result in the establishment of industrial facilities by private resources. The availability of adequate financial facilities, or programmes of land reform, can provide incentives for the release of new energies in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

14. Development requires a variety of resources, the greater part of which has necessarily to be mobilized internally by the developing country itself. External capital has, however, made a significant contribution to development by supplying goods and services not available for mobilization domestically in the countries of South and South East Asia. Capital to the Colombo Plan area has taken the form principally of grants and loans by governments, private foreign investment and loans from international financial institutions. As economic advances are made in the area, opportunities arise for greater resort to private investment and to private and public lending agencies as sources of external capital.

15. This assessment of the problems and issues of the future which arise out of a review of the past tends to underscore the value of the Consultative Committee as a forum for an annual exchange of views. Experience this year indicates that the desirability of such consultation increases rather than diminishes as development progress is made in South and South East Asia. The Committee clearly affords increasing opportunities for an increased interchange of experiences on common problems. As the Colombo Plan enters its sixth year there is renewed courage, confidence and determination to move ahead in the economic betterment of South and South East Asia. The record of achievement set forth in this Report gives reason to believe that, however great may be the difficulties ahead, they will be overcome.

Need for Alleviating Shortage of Merchant Shipping

*Statement by Robert T. Merrill
Chief of the Shipping Division*¹

My name is Robert T. Merrill. I am here at the kind invitation of the Federal Maritime Board to present on behalf of the Department of State certain considerations which lead the Department to believe that the United States public interest would be served by a decision to place in operation as soon as possible a number of vessels presently in the Maritime Administration's laid-up fleet. The Department is aware of and appreciates the reasoning which led the Congress in the Merchant Sales Act of 1946 to "sterilize" the unsold war-built vessels in the laid-up fleet, prescribing definite standards which must apply as a condition to breaking them out for operation. One of these standards, prescribed in section 5 (e), is that the Board be of the opinion that the operation of the vessels is required in the public interest.

Although the Department believes that under normal circumstances the provision of shipping services, both here and abroad, is a business best governed by the free play of economic forces, it is convinced that in the existing situation we are facing an emergency in shipping where the supply is grossly inadequate for the transport of necessary commercial cargoes and of programs sponsored by United States Government agencies. This situation of extreme shortage has led to the spiraling of rates to levels which will adversely affect the economic structures of friendly importing countries and which will not contribute to the long-term benefit of the countries providing the shipping services or of the shipping companies themselves.

The Department also would be reluctant to recommend the activation of vessels where the period of emergency could be so short that the proportion of break-out expense which might be recovered from operation would be disproportionately small, even when the betterment of the vessels due to break-out is considered. In this instance, however, it believes that the period during which the vessels are needed will be sufficiently long for the Government to recoup the costs involved.

¹ Made on Dec. 10 before the Federal Maritime Board.

Some of the foreign countries affected by the present shortage of ships were allies of this country in World War II. Some have been assisted in the recovery of their economies by moneys appropriated for Marshall plan aid and subsequent recovery programs because the Congress considered their recovery to be in the United States public interest. Some are parties, together with the United States, to North Atlantic Treaty joint defense arrangements. The Board previously has determined that the carriage of coal from the United States to specific friendly countries is in the United States public interest (the Isbrandtsen case, doc. no. M-67). Under present circumstances the economies of a number of friendly countries would be jeopardized by the shipping shortage which has developed due to the closing of the Suez Canal.

Estimates as to coal exports from the United States, which have been widely quoted in connection with the Board's decision of October 3 to charter 30 ships to American Coal Shipping, Inc., run over 40 million tons for 1956, 50 million tons for 1957, and as high as 100 million tons in 1960. European industrial production has been increasing, and fuel is needed to support that increase. Shipments from the United States of agricultural products, including grain, are well in advance of normal due to the Public Law 480 programs, and create an additional demand for bulk carriers. New construction of ships has not kept pace with the trend of exports and imports. For some time there has been little or no idle tonnage on the markets; every ship offered was soon employed. From the short- and long-range viewpoint, it does not appear that the release of a reasonable number of vessels from the laid-up fleet will adversely affect the employment of privately owned vessels, whether American or foreign.

The closing of the Suez Canal has complicated the situation, especially the need for tankers, but also for dry-cargo vessels. European firms capable of converting from oil to coal are doing so. Late in November the President approved the reactivation of the Middle East Emergency Committee, which will permit United States oil companies to do joint planning in the movement of petroleum supplies without penalty under the antitrust laws.² This should enable up to 500,000 barrels per day of additional oil to be transported from the United States Gulf and from Caribbean

² BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1956, p. 953.

areas to Western Europe. There is a shortage of dry-cargo vessels as well as of tankers, and more will be needed to meet the minimum fuel requirements of friendly countries. The Suez situation not only has raised rates but has increased the distances many ships must travel and so has increased the general need for more tonnage.

Estimates as to the time that will elapse before the canal is in full operation run as high as 6 months, although partial restoration of operation may be possible sooner.

The coal charter rate from Hampton Roads to the continent of Europe is now well in excess of \$15 per ton. When we add to that \$11, for the mine price of the coal plus the cost of bringing it to Hampton Roads, we have over \$26-per-ton coal at seaports in Belgium and Holland and possibly \$40 coal by the time it reaches the consumer. The European economy simply cannot function effectively on the basis of such high-priced fuel, and it is obvious that much of the recovery that has been accomplished with the assistance of the Marshall plan and subsequent enactments will be lost and that countries closely linked to us through NATO and other arrangements will be faced with a serious problem unless something is done to relieve the shortage of shipping which is a primary cause of such high rates. Moreover, we may well jeopardize the export market for coal, which on a continuing basis depends on our ability to deliver large tonnages at stable and competitive rates. If the rates are to increase still further, this would not be likely to attract more ships to the transport of coal because there are now no ships available unless taken from other necessary employment.

The Department is not favoring any particular application for the assignment of vessels. It believes that the Board and the Maritime Administration, in consultation when necessary with agencies responsible for the transport of Government programs, can best determine the number of ships needed to ease the shortage and can best work out, in accordance with the provisions of existing statutes, the terms and conditions of their employment. The Department hopes, however, from the standpoint of the foreign-relations responsibilities entrusted to it, that an adequate number of presently laid-up ships will be made available as soon as possible to meet the present and anticipated needs.

U. S., U. K., and Canada Declassify Additional Atomic Energy Data

*Statement by Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission*¹

AEC press release dated December 12

A large additional volume of technical information essential to the development of a civilian nuclear industry here and abroad is authorized for open publication under a revised policy covering the declassification of atomic energy information in the United States, Great Britain, and Canada.

The information declassified by the new guide, now approved by the three nations, relates to all phases of nuclear power from ore recovery and fabrication of fuel elements to the design and operation of plants for the chemical recycling of spent fuel elements from civilian reactors.

The new policies covering tripartite declassification involve many areas of nuclear activity. However, of prime interest to American industry is the newly authorized declassification of civilian power reactor information.

Data on concepts, physics, chemistry, components, and other aspects of these reactors have been available through previous tripartite declassification actions. Major release of research reactor data dates back to November 1950. Many categories of restricted data have been available to cleared individuals and organizations in this country under the Atomic Energy Commission's Civilian Access Permit Program.

The latest action will permit publication of a large portion of that information which hitherto has been governed by access permits. For example, among the facilities that become declassified under the new guide is our first full-scale civilian nuclear power plant now nearing completion at Shippingport near Pittsburgh, Pa.; also, the experimental sodium reactor at Santa Susana, Calif.; the second-stage homogeneous reactor at Oak Ridge, Tenn.; and several others.

However, the access permit program remains as an important aid to the continued integration of U.S. industry and management in the atomic energy program on a free competitive basis.

In addition, and clearly related to the reactor data which will become available, is the declassified

¹ Similar announcements were released simultaneously at London and Ottawa.

fication of the technology of heavy-water manufacture; final stages of the separation of zirconium and hafnium—two metals used in reactors; and the liquid thermal diffusion process of isotope separation, which may be used to make slightly enriched uranium fuel.

Of interest to our friends abroad, especially those now participating in the program of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy through bilateral agreements, is the fact that pursuant to today's actions the United States can now effectively cooperate with other friendly nations on an unclassified basis for civil power purposes. This will greatly facilitate the conclusion of agreements for cooperation.

Uranium mining operators, underwriters, and investors in the United States and in other uranium-producing countries will benefit by the removal of all tripartite restrictions on the publication of statistics on overall uranium ore reserves and present and future ore-concentrate production figures. The world uranium industry, which now represents a private investment of many million dollars, will be able to participate in planning for nuclear power development.

The revision of the guide is the result of the long study by the three nations of the security of information, jointly held, on nuclear data growing out of their wartime cooperation in atomic energy development.

As reports, drawings, and other materials are reviewed and declassified under the new guide and published, a substantial volume of information on peaceful uses of atomic energy will be added to the already large store of declassified data.

Today's announcement does not mean that all the newly declassified data will become available immediately, nor does it mean that the several hundred firms who now have classified material in their files, under the access permit program, will receive immediate notices as to exactly which data are declassified.

However, the Commission will move ahead rapidly in its review of classified information of interest to industry. The Commission expects to institute shortly an accelerated review program similar to the one that examined over 30,000 docu-

ments and reports early this year. Following this accelerated review, publication will be encouraged and the most useful of the declassified material should be available within 6 months or less.

The information to be released will provide a practical basis for enlarging and improving high school, college, and university curricula on nuclear science and engineering, and textbook publishers will be enabled to produce new, updated texts and general study aids on nuclear energy applications.

A like opportunity is opened up for the general, technical, and business press to provide a wider scope of information to those readers who need to know more about nuclear energy and its uses.

We are confident that the benefits of the actions announced today will have equal application in the United Kingdom and Canada. For the United States, the new large volume of information to be declassified should speed the development of civilian nuclear power here at home and at the same time enable us to be of greater assistance to other nations in fulfilling the broad aims of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

Applications of atomic energy in the reactor field which are primarily of military interest continue classified.

Letters of Credence

Ecuador

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ecuador, José R. Chiriboga V., presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on December 19. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 627.

Board of Foreign Scholarships

The President on December 18 appointed the following to be members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships for terms expiring September 22, 1959: Katherine G. Blyley (reappointment), George Charles S. Benson, and Robert G. Storey.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings ¹

Adjourned During December 1956

UNESCO General Conference: 9th Session	New Delhi	Nov. 5 -Dec. 5
ITU International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIT): Preliminary Study Group.	Geneva	Nov. 22-Dec. 7
Customs Cooperation Council: 9th Session	Brussels	Nov. 26-Dec. 1
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 13th Session and Working Parties.	Geneva	Nov. 26-Dec. 1
1st Inter-American Technical Meeting on Housing and Planning .	Bogotá	Nov. 26-Dec. 7
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	Dec. 3-7
FAO Plant Protection Committee for Southeast Asia and Pacific Region: 1st Meeting.	Bangkok	Dec. 3-7
FAO/WHO Technical Meeting on Food Additives	Rome	Dec. 3-10
ITU International Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIF): 18th Plenary Assembly (Final Meeting).	Geneva	Dec. 3-14
ICAO Panel on Aircraft Rescue and Fire-fighting Equipment at Aerodromes.	Montreal	Dec. 3-14
International Wheat Council: 21st Session	London	Dec. 4-5
Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): Ministerial Meeting.	Wellington, New Zealand	Dec. 4-8
UNESCO Executive Board: 46th Session	New Delhi	Dec. 6 (1 day)
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Semiannual Meeting of Directing Council.	Montevideo	Dec. 8-10
ITU International Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCIT): 8th Plenary Session (Final Meeting).	Geneva	Dec. 8-14
Symposium on Tropical Cyclones	Brisbane, Australia	Dec. 10-14
FAO European Contact Group on the Uses of Isotopes and Radiation in Agricultural Research: 1st Meeting.	Wageningen, Netherlands	Dec. 10-14
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee	Geneva	Dec. 10-14
Caribbean Commission: 23d Meeting	Barbados, British West Indies	Dec. 10-15
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Dec. 10-15
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Special Session	New York	Dec. 10-18
FAO Working Party on Price Support System	Rome	Dec. 10-21
U.N. ECE/FAO Conference on European Statisticians on 1960 Census Preparations.	Rome	Dec. 10-21
International Tin Study Group: Management Committee	London	Dec. 11 (1 day)
NATO Council: Ministerial Session	Paris	Dec. 11-14
SEATO Study Group on Skilled Labor	Bangkok	Dec. 13-19
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 5th Session of Working Party on Railway Track Sleepers.	Bangkok	Dec. 13-19
International Sugar Council: Special Session	London	Dec. 14 (1 day)
ITU International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIT): 1st Plenary Assembly of New CCIT (former CCIT and CCIF combined).	Geneva	Dec. 15-22
U.N. Economic and Social Council: Resumed 22d Session	New York	Dec. 17-21

In Session as of December 31, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference	Washington	Nov. 28, 1955-
U.N. General Assembly: 11th Session	New York	Nov. 12, 1956-

Scheduled January 1-March 31, 1957

ICAO Special North Atlantic Fixed Services Meeting	Montreal	Jan. 3-
ICAO Panel on Visual Aids to Approach and Landing: 1st Meeting.	London	Jan. 7-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Dec. 21, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; CCIT, formerly Comité consultatif international télégraphique, now Comité international télégraphique et téléphonique (CCIT and CCIF combined); U.N., United Nations; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; ILO, International Labor Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled January 1–March 31, 1957—Continued

U.N. ECOSOC Transport and Communications Commission: 8th Session.	New York	Jan. 7–
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale for Citrus Fruit.	Geneva	Jan. 7–
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party on Coconut and Coconut Products.	Colombo, Ceylon	Jan. 8–
ICEM Working Party	Geneva	Jan. 8–
WHO Executive Board: 19th Session	Geneva	Jan. 14*–
WMO Commission for Climatology: 2d Session	Washington	Jan. 14–
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 8th Meeting . .	Geneva	Jan. 14–
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods .	Geneva	Jan. 14–
ICAO Panel on Future Requirements of Turbo-Jet Aircraft: 2d Meeting.	Montreal	Jan. 21–
U.N. ECE/FAO International Consultation on Insulation Board, Hardboard, and Particle Board.	Geneva	Jan. 21–
WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 2d Session	Las Palmas, Canary Islands .	Jan. 21–
Conference for Coordination of Very High Frequency Maritime Mobile Frequencies in Certain High Traffic Areas of the North and Baltic Seas.	The Hague	Jan. 21–
U.N. Refugee Fund Standing Program Subcommittee: 4th Session .	Geneva	Jan. 23–
Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives: 2d Meeting.	Washington	Jan. 28–
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee: Airmail Subcommittee .	Luxor, Egypt	Jan. 29–
International Sugar Council: 11th Session	London	Jan. 29–
U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Jan. 29–
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 6th Session	Bangkok	Feb. 15–
U.N. ECOSOC Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Feb. 18–
ILO Governing Body: 134th Session (and Committees)	Geneva	Feb. 25–
U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission: 9th Session	New York	Feb. 25–
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Gas Problems: 2d Session .	Geneva	Feb. 25–
International Atomic Energy Agency: Preparatory Commission . .	New York	February
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee.	Lima, Peru	February*
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations . .	New York	Mar. 4–
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 5–
U.N. ECAFE Industry and Trade Committee: 9th Session . . .	Bangkok	Mar. 7–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 19th Session	New York	Mar. 10–
FAO <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Grains	Rome	Mar. 11–
ILO Inland Transport Committee: 6th Meeting	Hamburg	Mar. 11–
SEATO Council: 3d Meeting	Canberra, Australia	Mar. 11–
ICAO Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Division: 6th Session.	Montreal	Mar. 12–
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 28th Session	Rome	Mar. 18–
Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Safety and Health: 3d Session.	Geneva	Mar. 18–
U.N. ECAFE Commission: 13th Session	Bangkok	Mar. 18–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 11th Session . .	New York	Mar. 18–
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Mar. 18–
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: 27th Session.	Geneva	Mar. 25–
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 4th Session	Bandung, Indonesia	March
FAO Teak Subcommittee: 2d Session	Bandung, Indonesia	March
ILO Committee on Forced Labor: 2d Session	Geneva	March or April

Admission of Japan to the United Nations

The U.N. General Assembly on December 18 voted to admit Japan to membership in the United Nations. The vote was 77 in favor, none opposed (Hungary and the Union of South Africa were absent). Japan thus became the 80th member of the U.N.; the Assembly on November 12 had unanimously approved the admission of Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Following are texts of congratulatory messages from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, together with statements made by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in the Security Council during the debate on Japanese membership and in the General Assembly following the vote. (See also Secretary Dulles' remarks at his December 18 news conference, page 6.)

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO MR. HATOYAMA

White House press release dated December 18

His Excellency

ICHIRO HATOYAMA,

*Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.*

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Please accept my heartfelt congratulations to the Japanese Government and people upon Japan's achieving long-deserved membership in the United Nations. All free nations repose in this organization their confidence for the peaceful future of mankind. The membership of Japan makes this concept more meaningful than ever before. The American people rejoice in the action of the General Assembly today and welcome Japan as a new and worthy associate in the world's struggle for peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

SECRETARY DULLES TO MR. SHIGEMITSU

Press release 626 dated December 18

His Excellency

MAMORU SHIGEMITSU,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: I am profoundly gratified to welcome Japan as a member of the United

Nations. This marks a step for which the Japanese and American peoples have been waiting since the conclusion of the peace treaty of conciliation signed at San Francisco in 1951. I know that we can now look forward to the exertion of Japan's prestige and influence within the United Nations forum in the vigorous defense of freedom.

Sincerely,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

AMBASSADOR LODGE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DECEMBER 12

U.S./U.N. press release 2552

The United States has a high regard for the influence, the culture, and the great contribution to civilization of the great Japanese nation. We have long been aware of the contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the charter which Japan could make as a member of the United Nations. We are sure that the voice of Japan will be a significant addition to the growing participation and responsibility of Asian and of other countries in the United Nations. We also have a great regard and liking for her distinguished representative here, Ambassador [Toshikazu] Kase.

For all these reasons we have looked forward

January 7, 1957

with keen anticipation—and, I might say, impatience—to a meeting of the Security Council at which the application of Japan to become a member of the United Nations would at last receive the unanimous endorsement which it deserves. On four occasions since 1952, the United States, together with the great majority of the Security Council, has voted for and sponsored Japan's membership in the United Nations and has tried to be of every possible service to the Japanese Government in assisting it to obtain its rightful place. The grave injustice that has excluded Japan from the United Nations has long needed correction, and we have tried to leave no stone unturned.

Mr. President, I hope and trust that this meeting this morning is the meeting which we have so long awaited and which will mark Japan's entrance. The question before the Council is the application of Japan for membership in the United Nations. It is a question on which, if I am not mistaken, every member of the Security Council has now taken an affirmative stand. Our duty is therefore simple enough.

Since this question has been waiting for more than 4 years, I trust that now we can act upon it immediately and that the General Assembly can ratify the action of the Security Council in the immediate future and welcome Japan as the 80th member of the United Nations.¹

AMBASSADOR LODGE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 18

U.S. delegation press release 2564

It is the greatest pleasure to extend a warm welcome and the greetings of the United States of America to the newest member of the United Nations, a country with one of the oldest civilizations in the world—Japan.

Out of the productive springs of Japanese culture have come some of the finer things of life which have benefited the entire world. Classical Japanese drama, the delicate feelings of Japanese art, the simple beauty of their architecture, and

¹ The Security Council voted unanimously to recommend to the General Assembly that Japan be admitted (U.N. doc. S/3758).

the subtlety of their poetry have enriched the lives of all humanity.

With the addition of Japan to our membership, also, we bring into our midst not only an ancient civilization but also a country with an advanced technology and a modern outlook. This advanced level of technology will enable Japan to contribute greatly to the industrial development of less developed areas. As an industrial nation with a large international trade, Japan can be expected to contribute in many different ways to the work of the United Nations.

Japan began its ties with the modern world a century ago. The United States was actively involved in these new contacts from the very beginning, and our relations, with the exception of the tragic period of the Second World War, have been cordial and close. We confidently believe they will continue thus in the future. We are glad at the thought that a few years ago Mr. Dulles, who is now our Secretary of State, personally undertook the negotiations which resulted in the peace treaty with Japan which restored Japan to its proper sovereign role in the community of nations.

The steady and vigorous efforts of many governments and many people have finally resulted in Japanese admission to this great world forum after it had been unjustly denied its rightful place for many years by a clear-cut abuse of the veto. Let me in particular pay tribute to the untiring efforts of the distinguished representative from Peru, Ambassador Belaunde, through his chairmanship of the Good Offices Committee. The part that he played was indispensable and is a monument to his sagacity and statesmanship.

As representative of the host government, I extend a cordial greeting to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Shigemitsu, and assure him that the United States delegation to the United Nations is looking forward to the constructive contributions which I am confident the Japanese delegation will render to the United Nations on all of the complicated issues with which we must deal.

Mr. President, the admission of this great nation marks a great day for the United Nations. It will greatly increase the influence, vigor, and the value of our organization.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Economic and Social Council

- Technical Assistance Committee. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Administrative and operational services costs. Report of the Technical Assistance Board. E/TAC/54, October 31, 1956. 16 pp. mimeo.
- Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Date, Duration and Agenda of any Further Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations Interested in the Eradication of Prejudice and Discrimination that may be Convened. Report of the Secretary-General on the results of his consultations with non-governmental organizations. E/CN.4/Sub.2/180, November 5, 1956. 42 pp. mimeo.
- Transport and Communications Commission. Situation with Respect to Ratification of the Convention on Road Traffic (1949). E/CN.2/176, November 6, 1956, and E/CN.2/176/Corr.1, November 8, 1956. 8 pp. mimeo.
- Transport and Communications Commission. Regional Developments in the Field of Inland Transport. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.2/175, November 10, 1956. 22 pp. mimeo.
- Transport and Communications Commission. Co-ordination of the Activities of Specialized Agencies in the Field of Transport and Communications. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.2/178, November 10, 1956. 14 pp. mimeo.
- Transport and Communications Commission. Co-ordination of Inland Transport. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.2/182, November 13, 1956. 8 pp. mimeo.
- Transport and Communications Commission. Information on Technical Assistance Activities in the Field of Transport and Communications. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.2/184, November 13, 1956. 17 pp. mimeo.
- Transport and Communications Commission. Passports and Frontier Formalities. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.2/185, November 14, 1956. 24 pp. mimeo.
- Negotiation of an Agreement with the International Finance Corporation. E/2935, November 20, 1956. Note by the Secretary-General. 1 p. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

Status of Deposit of Acceptances of International Wheat Agreement

Press release 628 dated December 20

The International Wheat Agreement of 1956 has been formally accepted by governments representing well over the required two-thirds of the wheat sales and purchases guaranteed in the agreement.¹

¹For text of agreement, see S. Exec. I, 84th Cong., 2d sess.; for texts of President Eisenhower's message of transmittal to the Senate and Secretary Dulles' report to the President on the agreement, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1956, p. 26.

The U.S. Government is the depositary for instruments of acceptance and accession. December 1 was the deadline for the deposit of instruments by those countries which had in July notified the United States of intention to accept the agreement.

On or before December 1, instruments of acceptance of the agreement were deposited with the Government of the United States by the following "importing country" signatory governments listed in annex A to article III: Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, Vatican City State, and Yugoslavia.

On or before December 1, instruments of accession to the agreement were deposited with the Government of the United States by the following "importing country" nonsignatory governments in accordance with article XXI of the agreement: Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Venezuela. (Panama deposited its instrument of acceptance on December 14, 1956, having been granted an extension of time for that purpose by the International Wheat Council.)

On or before December 1, instruments of acceptance of the agreement were deposited with the Government of the United States by the following "exporting country" signatory governments listed in annex B to article III: Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Sweden, and the United States of America.

Present membership of the agreement accounts for 100 percent of the guaranteed sales and approximately 85 percent of the guaranteed purchases listed in the agreement.

The agreement is in force pursuant to paragraph 3 of article XX thereof, wherein it is provided that organizational and administrative portions of the agreement enter into force as of July 16, 1956, and the portions of the agreement relating to "rights and obligations" take effect from August 1, 1956.

The 1956 agreement prolongs for a period of 3 years, with certain modifications, the arrangements with respect to purchases and sales of wheat first established by the International Wheat Agreement of 1949 and renewed with modifications in 1953. The stated objective of this agree-

ment, and its predecessors, is to "assure supplies of wheat to importing countries and markets for wheat to exporting countries at equitable and stable prices."

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, November 21, 1956. Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, November 21, 1956.

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48 (a), 49 (e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.

Ratifications deposited: Libya, December 6, 1956; Greece, December 12, 1956.

Entered into force: December 12, 1956.

Genocide

Convention on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.²

Accession deposited: Tunisia, November 29, 1956.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating cultivation of the poppy plant, production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953.¹

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, November 27, 1956.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to membership: Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia, November 12, 1956; Japan, December 18, 1956.

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Signatures: Tunisia, October 9, 1956; Morocco, November 7, 1956.

Acceptances deposited: Morocco, November 7, 1956; Tunisia, November 8, 1956.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1956. Open for signature at Washington through May 18, 1956. Entered into force July 16, 1956, for parts 1, 3, 4, and 5, and August 1, 1956 for part 2.

Acceptance deposited: Panama, December 14, 1956.

Proclaimed by the President: December 11, 1956.

BILATERAL

Burma

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 8, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3498, 3628). Effected by exchange of notes at Rangoon December 4, 1956. Entered into force December 4, 1956.

Canada

Agreement relating to the dredging of the north channel of Cornwall Island. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 7 and December 4, 1956. Entered into force December 4, 1956.

Finland

Agreement amending the preamble and articles 1 and 8 of the agreement of July 2, 1952 (TIAS 2555), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Helsinki November 30, 1956. Entered into force November 30, 1956.

Spain

Agreement for disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of September 26, 1953 (TIAS 2849), and no longer required by Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid November 27, 1956. Entered into force November 27, 1956.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Offices

The Department of State announced on December 14 that, effective December 12, 1956, a Consulate General was established at Aleppo, Syria. Alfred Atherton is the principal officer at Aleppo.

January 7, 1956;

signature
ered into
nd August1956.
56.es agree-
AS 3498,
gon De-
4, 1956.channel
notes at
Enteredand 8 of
financing
ected by
30, 1956.materials
tual De-
26, 1953
ain. Ef-
mber 27,

CE

mber 14
General
on is the

ulletin

American Republics. Representatives of American Presidents To Hold Second Meeting . . .**Asia.** Colombo Plan Nations Review Economic Progress (texts of communique and report extract) . . .**Atomic Energy**

U.S. Extends Invitation to Euratom Committee (Dulles, Spaak) . . .

U.S., U.K., and Canada Declassify Additional Atomic Energy Data (Strauss) . . .

Canada. U.S., U.K., and Canada Declassify Additional Atomic Energy Data (Strauss) . . .**Czechoslovakia.** Interference by Czechoslovak Police With Visitors to U.S. Embassy (text of note) . . .**Department and Foreign Service**

Board of Foreign Scholarships . . .

Consular Offices . . .

Economic Affairs

British Arrangements With Monetary Fund and Eximbank (Jacobsson) . . .

Colombo Plan Nations Review Economic Progress (texts of communique and report extract) . . .

Need for Alleviating Shortage of Merchant Shipping (Merrill) . . .

Ecuador. Letters of Credence (Chiriboga) . . .**Educational Exchange.** Board of Foreign Scholarships . . .**Europe**

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .

U.S. Extends Invitation to Euratom Committee (Dulles, Spaak) . . .

France. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .**Germany.** Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .**Hungary.** Additional U.S. Contribution to U.N. for Hungarian Refugees (Lodge, Read, Hammarskjold, De Seynes) . . .**Japan**

Admission of Japan to the United Nations (Eisenhower, Dulles, Lodge) . . .

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .

International Organizations and Meetings

Calendar of Meetings . . .

Colombo Plan Nations Review Economic Progress (texts of communique and report extract) . . .

NATO Council Resolutions . . .

Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO . . .

Mutual Security. Mutual Security and Soviet Foreign Aid (Claxton) . . .**Near East.** Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .**North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

NATO Council Resolutions . . .

Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO . . .

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .

Presidential Documents. Admission of Japan to the United Nations . . .

11

30

29

35

35

11

36

42

28

30

34

36

36

36

39

3

30

17

18

12

3

39

Refugees and Displaced Persons. Additional U.S.

Contribution to U.N. for Hungarian Refugees (Lodge, Read, Hammarskjold, De Seynes) . . .

Syria. Consular Offices . . .**Treaty Information**

Current Actions . . .

Status of Deposit of Acceptances of International Wheat Agreement . . .

U.S.S.R.

Mutual Security and Soviet Foreign Aid (Claxton) . . .

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .

United Kingdom

British Arrangements With Monetary Fund and Eximbank (Jacobsson) . . .

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .

U.S., U.K., and Canada Declassify Additional Atomic Energy Data (Strauss) . . .

United Nations

Additional U.S. Contribution to U.N. for Hungarian Refugees (Lodge, Read, Hammarskjold, De Seynes) . . .

Admission of Japan to the United Nations (Eisenhower, Dulles, Lodge) . . .

Current U.N. Documents . . .

Yugoslavia. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of December 18 . . .

Name Index

Atherton, Alfred . . .

Chiriboga V., José R . . .

Claxton, Philander P., Jr . . .

De Seynes, Philippe . . .

Dulles, Secretary . . .

Eisenhower, President . . .

Hammarskjold, Dag . . .

Jacobsson, Per . . .

Lange, Halvard . . .

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr . . .

Martino, Gaetano . . .

Merrill, Robert T . . .

Pearson, Lester B . . .

Read, James M . . .

Spaak, Paul-Henri . . .

Strauss, Lewis L . . .

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 17-23

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

No.	Date	Subject
622	12/17	Colombo Plan communique.
*623	12/18	Educational exchange.
624	12/18	Dulles: news conference.
†625	12/18	Members of Nixon party.
626	12/18	Dulles: message to Shigemitsu.
627	12/19	Ecuador credentials (rewrite).
628	12/20	Status of Wheat Agreement acceptances.
629	12/21	Dulles-Spaak letters concerning EURATOM.
630	12/21	Meeting of Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



the
Department
of
State

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(GPO)

The Search for Disarmament

Publication 6398

20 Cents

The Search for Disarmament, a 35-page pamphlet, discusses several aspects of the compelling problem of disarmament, "the limitation, regulation, and control of arms." The pamphlet, based on an address by Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, covers the following topics:

- the nature and urgency of the problem;
- disarmament as a safeguard of the national security;
- disarmament as an integral part of national policy;
- major periods of negotiations;
- the present status of disarmament negotiations;
- prospects for disarmament.

Copies of *The Search for Disarmament* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at 20 cents each.

Order Form

To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

Enclosed find:

\$
(cash, check, or
money order).

Please send me copies of *The Search for Disarmament*.

Name:

Street Address:

City, Zone, and State:

